Usamah bin Laden

The past few days have seen a flurry of prognostications on al-Qaeda and its future. While each argument spars over whether al-Qaeda is on the ropes or resurgent, they miss a vital segment of analysis. What are al-Qaeda’s grassroots supporters saying?

Unlike Western media, which has obsessively been writing about the anniversary, bin Laden’s supporters have not shown much initiative in remembering his legacy. In the days leading up to the anniversary of bin Laden’s “martyrdom,” there were a couple of threads on the forums that posted photoshopped pictures of bin Laden with al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem behind him, adorned with flowers on the ground and an AK-47 on the side, along with other similar images. There was also a poem written in his honour.

It is still possible that online jihadis as well as supporters attached to al-Qaeda’s branches or individuals unaffiliated such as key ideologues could release commemorations, since most eulogies released last year for bin Laden were in the weeks after his death. Since then bin Laden has been highlighted in Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s video message “Days With the Imam #1,” released last November. Bin Laden was also celebrated in Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin’s messageon the merger with al-Qaeda this February. In doing so, al-Shabab reiterated its fealty they gave to bin Laden would also hold true to al-Zawahiri. This hearkened back to al-Shabab’s original pledge of allegiance to bin Laden when they releaseda video in 2009 titled “Labayk ya Usama” (At Your Service Oh Usama).

Overall, though, one has not seen too much in the past year. There are two potential explanations: individuals still remember bin Laden, but have moved on, or they view celebrating his “martyrdom” as contrary to Islam.

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Here is the AfPak Channel’s post on it:

2011 was an incredible year for news around the world. Now that it’s behind us, here are the 10 most-read articles and collections from the AfPak Channel in the last year:

1. Aaron Y. Zelin — The bin Laden Aftermath: The Internet jihadis react

2. Joshua Foust — The Battle for Marjah, Reviewed

3. Asra Q. Nomani — The real shame in Pakistan

4. Michael Waltz — Don’t hold back with Pakistan

5. 10 years of War: An FP Roundtable

6. Mehreen Farooq and Waleed Ziad — Pakistan’s most powerful weapon

7. Huma Imtiaz — Behind the scenes of Raymond Davis’s release

8. Asra Q. Nomani — Saif al-Adel and the death of Daniel Pearl

9. Teresita Schaffer and Howard Schaffer — Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir: A grand bargan? 

10. C. Christine Fair — Explaining the inexplicable: Murder at Mazar

— Peter Bergen and Andrew Lebovich

Last week, Ansar al-Shari’ah, (Supporters of Shari’ah), based in Yemen, released its first video titled “The Opening [Conquests] of Zinjibar.” Since mid-April, many analysts and scholars have wondered where this apparently new group came from, who its members were, and what connections it has to al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

The name Ansar al-Shari’ah was first mentioned in an unofficial audio release by AQAP’s leading shari’ah official, Shaykh Abu Zubayr ‘Adil bin ‘Abdullah al-Abab, who conducted a question and answer session with online global jihadi activists through PalTalk in Ghorfah Minbar al-Ansar (Pulpit Room of the Supporters). The first question was “What is the general situation of the mujahidin in Yemen and the status of the Shabab Ansar al-Shari’ah?” al-Abab responded that when they recruit new members to AQAP, they first introduce themselves under the banner of Ansar al-Shari’ah. But why would they need to do that? Has the AQ brand really become that tarnished? And is Ansar al-Shari’ah really AQAP?

Some have been skeptical of links between AQAP and Ansar al-Shari’ah. While conclusive evidence is lacking, there are several strong indicators. Ansar al-Shari’ah’s first video release, which was not published by AQAP’s media outlet al-Malahim (the Epics), highlighted “martyrs” who were also eulogized in the most recent issue of AQAP’s Inspire Magazine — Abu ‘Ali al-Harithi, ‘Ali bin Salih bin Jalal and ‘Amar ‘Abadah al-Wa’ili. Although this is not proof of collusion, there clearly seems to be some overlap. Ansar al-Shari’ah may be a subsidiary of AQAP used for recruitment and foot soldiers in Yemen’s incipient civil war. It is telling that AQAP may be recruiting individuals using a different name.

We have also recently learned that Usama bin Laden may have been looking to change the name of al-Qa’ida central. According to press reports based on leaked information from the raid that killed bin Laden, al-Qai’da’s central leadership in Pakistan was debating a couple of options for its name. This was spurred in part by the Western habit of referring to the group as al-Qa’ida, rather than its official name of Tandhim Qa’idat al-Jihad (The Base Organization of Jihad). The leadership felt that the West’s habit of omitting the word “jihad” robbed them of some of their religious legitimacy. Unfortunately for al-Qa’ida, the two alternative names on the table were a mouthful – Ta’ifat at-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (Sect of Monotheism and Jihad) and Jama’at ’I‘adat al-Khilafah al-Rashidiyyah (Restoration Group of the Rashidun Caliphate). Ultimately, they decided to stick with Tandhim Qa’idat al-Jihad.

The name game isn’t new. al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) attempted to rehabilitate its image following the death of its leader,  the notorious butcher Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, in 2006. AQI changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) as a way of rebranding itself because many Iraqis were repulsed by the organization’s overuse of violence, as well as the perception that it was made up of foreigners. The latter is also the reason they announced Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, a purported Iraqi, as their new leader, although it has been disputed whether he was actually a real person. In the years since, the name change has not done much for AQI’s credibility. It remains a threat, but is a shadow of its former self.

Another place where naming is an issue is in Somalia, where Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin (The Movement of the Holy Warrior Youth) has pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden but has not changed its name to become an al-Qa’ida franchise. Leah Farrall recently wrote an excellent overview on this topic in the most recent issue of the CTC Sentinel. Although it is a great addition to the literature, there were also other explanations for the lack of formal name change. Reportedly, al-Qa’ida itself opposed the name change because it did not want al-Shabab to sully its so-called “street cred” by using its polarizing brand. It is difficult to ascertain whether these reports are credible. But the very discussion shows the growing pitfalls of the al-Qa’ida brand.

All told, the al-Qa’ida brand is not favorable anymore – even for its senior leadership. It’s a big problem if AQAP is able to recruit more individuals by rejecting the brand and taking on a name with more religious significance.[1]

Even if the brand name is discredited, AQ’s ideas still resonate with many, especially if it can be repackaged for local contexts, as in the apparent case of AQAP. As we have seen in the past, AQ is a very nimble organization that learns, evolves, and quickly adapts to a rapidly changing “battlefield.” It would be wise for our policy makers and government officials to heed these subtle changes in its counterterrorism strategies. Otherwise, we are fighting an imaginary enemy, one that only exists in our minds or that existed in 2001 or 2008, but not in 2011.


[1] Ansar or the supporters played an important role in early Islamic history when the Muslim prophet Muhammad was still preaching and calling people to Islam. Ansar were the individuals in Medina that helped Muhammad and his followers following its hijra from Mecca. Therefore, the use of the term Ansar acts as a strong link to the past that appeals to the average Muslim. Further, when attaching it to the Shari’ah, which has primacy in the lives of religious Muslims, Ansar al-Shari’ah becomes a catchy and useful name that is stronger in Islamic terms than Tandhim Qa’idat al-Jihad.

On May 4, Asad al-Jihad2, a popular “Internet Shaykh” posted what was described as a referendum poll with five questions. One should be reminded that this is not a scientific poll and there is a possibility that peer pressure led some to answer certain questions a certain way since it was an open and not closed poll. Therefore, it may not be completely representative of what all grassroots online jihadi activists believe. With that caveat, it still provides some insight, which would be worthwhile to share. As such, below I translated into English the questions and the results as of May 6, 2011 (once the al-Qaeda statement was released the referendum was closed).

1. Do you think it is correct that the power of al-Qaeda will decline with the “martyrdom” of Usamah bin Laden?

Yes: 0; No: 48

2. If the news is true of the martyrdom of the Father Shaykh Usamah bin Laden; Do you expect attacks to stop inside or outside the United States or increase?

Yes, increase: 47; No: 1

3. Do you believe that the Pakistani government was involved in the operation?

Yes: 43; No: 5

4. Do you think the United States will take this event as a moral victory back to its people and the world to withdraw from Afghanistan, instead of declaring defeat at the hands of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which grows in strength?

Yes: 38; No: 10

5. Do you wish for your children to be like Usamah bin Laden?

Yes: 48; No 0



From the above results one can surmise the following conclusions about how online jihadi grassroots activists felt prior to al-Qaeda confirming the death of Bin Laden:

  • al-Qaeda will continue to be a strong organization that will be able to conduct increasingly more attacks against the United States.
  • The Pakistani government was involved with the operation to kill Bin Laden
  • The United States will use the death of Bin Laden as an excuse to claim victory and withdraw from Afghanistan even though the Taliban and al-Qaeda have defeated United States.
  • They all hope that their children grow up to be like Usamah bin Laden

Some of the individuals expanded upon their answers with more detail. Currently, I am too busy to delve deeply into it, but I hope to use it in an expanded article that systematically looks at the grassroots’, Internet Shaykhs’, and jihadi organizations’ responses to the death of Bin Laden pre and post-AQ’s statement.

Seit der amerikanische Präsident Barack Obama die Tötung Usama Bin Ladins bekanntgegeben hat, wird in den globalen Dschihadisten-Foren darüber debattiert, ob Bin Ladin tatsächlich tot ist. Viele Sympathisanten äußern sich skeptisch. Dies entspricht der Reaktion, die von der Gruppe “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan”(TTP) und den afghanischen Taliban zu hören war. Andererseits wird in vielen Foren Bin Ladin gepriesen und sein Tod akzeptiert. Diejenigen, die nicht an seinen Tod glauben, drohen für den Fall, dass er tot ist, Racheaktionen an.

Am Montag war auf BBC-Arabic zunächst eine Videobotschaft von Wali Al-Rehman verbreitet worden, dem Kommandeur der Taliban in Südwasiristan, der zufolge Bin Ladin nicht tot sei. Später wurde indirekt eingeräumt, er lebe womöglich doch nicht mehr. Nun seien der pakistanische Präsident Zardari und die Armee das wichtigste Ziel, Amerika das zweitwichtigste Ziel, sagte der TTP-Sprecher Ihsanullah Ihsan. Bei den afghanischen Taliban heißt es noch anders. Ihr Sprecher Zabihullah Mujahid sagte, es gebe noch keinen Beweis von Bin Ladins Tod.

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NOTE: The below piece was based on early reactions from the forums between the announcement and ~9AM Central Time in the US. I have continued to cull some newer quotes here. As the day has gone on, there is a lot more skepticism within the grassroots of the online jihādī movement and whether Bin Lāden is actually dead since the US has yet to release any hard proof as well as the fact that they allegedly put his body in the sea quickly. Therefore, many are still holding out to hear from the mujāhidīn instead of “kuffār” sources.

Following President Barack Obama’s announcement yesterday of the operation that killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, the latter’s online grassroots supporters in forums and blogs began quickly to respond. These pronouncements provide key insights into how these activists view Bin Laden as well as their continued commitment to the movement, showing a range of emotions but also the durability of the ideas that bin Laden worked so hard to propagate through propaganda and massive anti-civilian violence.

Below is a taste of the reactions from members of some of the major pro-jihadi forums, including the Ansar Arabic Forum, the English Islamic Awakening Forum, al-Jahad al-‘Alami Arabic Forum, and the Jamia Hafsa Urdu Forum (also in English). Many expressed shock at the news and did not want to believe that he had really been killed. A member of the Ansar Forum wrote, “How sound is the news of the martyrdom of Sheikh Osama bin Laden?” While another responded “O Allah, make this news not true.” Another quipped in a different post “God willing, [this] news is not true. Catastrophic if it is authentic.”

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