Asad al-Jihad2 posts a Referendum Poll at the Ansar al-Mujahidin Arabic Forum: Results

May 10, 2011
Ansar al-Mujahidin Arabic Forum, Asad al-Jihad2, Forums, Referendum, Usamah bin Laden

On May 4, Asad al-Jihad2, a popular “Internet Shaykh” posted what was described as a referendum poll with five questions. One should be reminded that this is not a scientific poll and there is a possibility that peer pressure led some to answer certain questions a certain way since it was an open and not closed poll. Therefore, it may not be completely representative of what all grassroots online jihadi activists believe. With that caveat, it still provides some insight, which would be worthwhile to share. As such, below I translated into English the questions and the results as of May 6, 2011 (once the al-Qaeda statement was released the referendum was closed).

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1. Do you think it is correct that the power of al-Qaeda will decline with the “martyrdom” of Usamah bin Laden?

Yes: 0; No: 48

2. If the news is true of the martyrdom of the Father Shaykh Usamah bin Laden; Do you expect attacks to stop inside or outside the United States or increase?

Yes, increase: 47; No: 1

3. Do you believe that the Pakistani government was involved in the operation?

Yes: 43; No: 5

4. Do you think the United States will take this event as a moral victory back to its people and the world to withdraw from Afghanistan, instead of declaring defeat at the hands of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which grows in strength?

Yes: 38; No: 10

5. Do you wish for your children to be like Usamah bin Laden?

Yes: 48; No 0

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Source: http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=38100

–

From the above results one can surmise the following conclusions about how online jihadi grassroots activists felt prior to al-Qaeda confirming the death of Bin Laden:

  • al-Qaeda will continue to be a strong organization that will be able to conduct increasingly more attacks against the United States.
  • The Pakistani government was involved with the operation to kill Bin Laden
  • The United States will use the death of Bin Laden as an excuse to claim victory and withdraw from Afghanistan even though the Taliban and al-Qaeda have defeated United States.
  • They all hope that their children grow up to be like Usamah bin Laden

Some of the individuals expanded upon their answers with more detail. Currently, I am too busy to delve deeply into it, but I hope to use it in an expanded article that systematically looks at the grassroots’, Internet Shaykhs’, and jihadi organizations’ responses to the death of Bin Laden pre and post-AQ’s statement.

Post-Bin Laden Death Media Appearances

May 6, 2011
Media, Usamah bin Laden

Check out my new article at The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: “Glückwunsch, Usama, wehe Obama!”

May 5, 2011
Forums, Usamah bin Laden

Seit der amerikanische Präsident Barack Obama die Tötung Usama Bin Ladins bekanntgegeben hat, wird in den globalen Dschihadisten-Foren darüber debattiert, ob Bin Ladin tatsächlich tot ist. Viele Sympathisanten äußern sich skeptisch. Dies entspricht der Reaktion, die von der Gruppe “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan”(TTP) und den afghanischen Taliban zu hören war. Andererseits wird in vielen Foren Bin Ladin gepriesen und sein Tod akzeptiert. Diejenigen, die nicht an seinen Tod glauben, drohen für den Fall, dass er tot ist, Racheaktionen an.

Am Montag war auf BBC-Arabic zunächst eine Videobotschaft von Wali Al-Rehman verbreitet worden, dem Kommandeur der Taliban in Südwasiristan, der zufolge Bin Ladin nicht tot sei. Später wurde indirekt eingeräumt, er lebe womöglich doch nicht mehr. Nun seien der pakistanische Präsident Zardari und die Armee das wichtigste Ziel, Amerika das zweitwichtigste Ziel, sagte der TTP-Sprecher Ihsanullah Ihsan. Bei den afghanischen Taliban heißt es noch anders. Ihr Sprecher Zabihullah Mujahid sagte, es gebe noch keinen Beweis von Bin Ladins Tod.

Click here for the rest.

Check out my new article at Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel: “The bin Laden aftermath: The Internet jihadis react”

May 2, 2011
Forums, Usamah bin Laden

NOTE: The below piece was based on early reactions from the forums between the announcement and ~9AM Central Time in the US. I have continued to cull some newer quotes here. As the day has gone on, there is a lot more skepticism within the grassroots of the online jihādī movement and whether Bin Lāden is actually dead since the US has yet to release any hard proof as well as the fact that they allegedly put his body in the sea quickly. Therefore, many are still holding out to hear from the mujāhidīn instead of “kuffār” sources.

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Following President Barack Obama’s announcement yesterday of the operation that killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, the latter’s online grassroots supporters in forums and blogs began quickly to respond. These pronouncements provide key insights into how these activists view Bin Laden as well as their continued commitment to the movement, showing a range of emotions but also the durability of the ideas that bin Laden worked so hard to propagate through propaganda and massive anti-civilian violence.

Below is a taste of the reactions from members of some of the major pro-jihadi forums, including the Ansar Arabic Forum, the English Islamic Awakening Forum, al-Jahad al-‘Alami Arabic Forum, and the Jamia Hafsa Urdu Forum (also in English). Many expressed shock at the news and did not want to believe that he had really been killed. A member of the Ansar Forum wrote, “How sound is the news of the martyrdom of Sheikh Osama bin Laden?” While another responded “O Allah, make this news not true.” Another quipped in a different post “God willing, [this] news is not true. Catastrophic if it is authentic.”

Click here to read the rest.

From Jihadology: Usāmah Bin Lāden is Dead- Forum Reactions (and translations)

May 1, 2011
al-Jahad al-'Alami Forum, al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Haqq French Forum, Ansar al-Mujahidin Arabic Forum, Ansar al-Mujahidin English Forum, Dawa al-Haq Arabic Blog, Islam Bruederschaft German Blog, Islamic Awakening Forum, Jamia Hafsia Urdu Forum, Usamah bin Laden

NOTE: Older quotes are first. Newest quotes toward the bottom of this post. This post was last updated 5/2/11 9:10PM US Central time.

–

“How sound is the news of the martyrdom of Sheikh Osama bin Laden?”

“O Allah, make this news not true”

“Allah protect us in our loss”

“God willing, news is not true. Catastrophic if it is authentic.”

“O Lord for your kindness”

“May Allah increase you rank in Jannah o Sheikh Usamah!”

“Ameen AMEEN AMEEN! May Allah give you a place next to our beloved Prophet (saws), ameen ameen”

“Please everyone calm and pray”

“We ask God to be the news is not true Lord of the Worlds”

“God damn you, Obama”

“Shut up and delete this thread”

“I think the Americans are doing this to make a good excuse for leaving Afg this year.”

“I hope with tears in my eyes that it is false. But if it is the will of Allah(swt) then may Allah(swt) grant the Sheikh ul Mujahideen, the status of a Shaheed and a place in Jannat ul Firdaus..”

“Inna li Allahi wa inna ilaihi raaji’oon. May Allah forgive his sins and raise him to the ranks of greatest Shuhada in the modern history of Islam.Ameen”

“Jihad will not stop because of Sheikh’s death, it will continue until we gain victory.”

“Kullna osama bin laden kullna osama bin laden kullna osama bin laden”

“I’m with Osama either in winning a victory or earning status as a martyr”

“May Allah accept his martyrdom and enter him into al-Firdaws with the Ambiya, Shuhada and the Saliheen.This day is the greatest day of shame in the history of Pakistan and what dignity had been left in calling oneself a Pakistani has now gone. Wallahi if the people of Pakistan keep on tolerating the kufr and riddah of that filthy kafir Zardari after this day, then may Allah deal with them as He sees fit.However, not all is so bad. Events like this are sent by Allah to remove the munafiqeen from the ranks of the Muslims. In the aftermath of this, we’ll see many munafiqeen, including ‘scholars’, come out in happiness and support for the Americans.Good news for Osama inshallah and good results for this Ummah inshallah.”

“This has not been confirmed by the Mujahideen what ever the out come Usamah bin Laden is the most influencial man of our times and May Allah accept all his sacrifices ameen”

“If it is true then we must thank Allah that America was not able to capture him alive. Else they would be humiliating him like Saddam Hussain. At last he may have find his greatest desire of Shahada.”

“Think not of those killed in the way of Allah dead, but alive with the Lord. We consider him a martyr. O Allah, accept the martyrs. And join us by the Lord of the Worlds”

“Brothers and sisters the order to attack the shaykh didn’t come from Obama, it came from Allah SWT and we should be aware that Allah SWT has the power to obliterate the White House in no time. So have yaqeen in Allah SWT because today the kufaar celebrate but tomorrow the ash of their fitna will block out their joy.”

“It seems obama has secured his seat in the white for the next term. This week only, he proved the world he was born in america by releasing his birth certificate and now he killed america’s worst enemy.”

“The celebrations are amusing. Cheer all you want kuffar, you only have a limited amount of time in this dunya in which to do it. And then you will see the reality of this life.”

“I hope Allah sends them [an] earthquake that will choke them further”

“And if its true it would be the most shameful moment for the pakistani people who could not protect 1 muslim hero…its a black day and a day when we should keep our voices and gazes lowi personally feel the lowest i have ever felt, we couldnt protect our beloved Sheikh”

“Mashallah the whole nation is celebrating the death of one man. Shaykh osama was a true lion.”

“We renew our pledge of allegiance with the Covenant and the first with the Lord to continue our path until the end. We will continue .. We will continue .. We will continue ..”

“Coming Oh America; Coming Oh Jews, Coming Oh rejectionists (Shi’a); Coming Oh Kufar, secularists, and apostates. Arrivals are coming and they are bringing the coffins with merciless devices”

“May Allah bring thousands osama to give nusra to his deen”

“Ya ikhwati wa akhawati, hold your horses. No conclusion should be derived until we get word from Muslims who are affiliated with him and who can confirm so. No words should be taken from the enemies of Islam and Muslims. They faked so many videos in the past of him, so why can this not be one of them? Just look at those beer-drinking, hog-eating, incestuous, red-necks, uncle sams, house negros, vatos locos, all celebrating outside the White House. It’s like a holiday for them. Really a sad bunch of people. I’m just waiting for the Chocolaty Muslims, Talafies, and those borderline murtad/moderates to join the ugly bandwagon of cheering this so-called victory.”

“I dont get it. How come Shaykh was living next to militray area and he was not seen before. Seems like a plot of america to wage war on pk. Anyways, it will be good to see pk fighting america ….actually Excellent!”

“please let them celebrate, they are celebrating their own end.
osama is in the heart of every muslim, even those who dont admit publicly.
in sha Allah its the start of something. this is the day muslims will remember Allah alot and seek the destruction of this pharoanic nation of our time.
oh Allah destroy this nation for their hatred and enmity toward your deen
oh Allah seal their hearts with disbelief they shall never taste faith untill they taste your severe punishment.
oh Allah send them endless tornados to destroy their homes and earthquakes to crash them.”

“Why can’t people admit he was killed? he is a human being, not a prophet. another man will replace his shoes, its easy.”

“The kuffar can show only symbolic success. Militarily, the beaten, like the Russians in Chechnya. Whenever the Russians have claimed that Doku Umarov has fallen and he reported back again and again.”

“Death of the commander of the Mujahideen Sheikh Osama bin Laden – as he had wished – a new victory for the approach of the Islamic Jihad”

Anjem Choudary’s reaction to the death of Bin Laden. He’s the leader of UK jihadi group al-Muhajirun: http://bit.ly/jHyzTZ

“I think America knows that Sheikh Osama already passed away in recent years. Now they have planned to take advantage of his confirmed death. And they are taking advantage as US people have greatly appreciated the news. Also this news have pressurize the Pakistani intelligence that Osama was declared to be found in a sensitive settled area.”

“We should not forget that these illitarete idiots in the past have killed sheikh ayman zawahiri many times sheikh osama and cmdr ilyas kashmiri in their dream. Let the kuffar and murtadeen keep dreaming.”

“Yes, the Covenant continues until the establishment of the law of God in the land”

“We are all Osama bin Laden, God willing; We are all Osama bin Laden, God willing; We are all Osama bin Laden, God willing; We are all Osama bin Laden, God willing”

New statement from Hānī al-Sibā’ī: “Congratulations Osama .. Woe Obama .. And Woe to the Traitors of Pakistan”

“Si la nouvel est vrai ,mon coeur sera plus que jamais brisé par cette nouvel , mais j’ai moi aussi le sentiment que cela est vrai , car il ont annoncer qu’il détenait le corps du Cheikh ( Allahou A’lem ) et ces derniers temps , je ne sais pas si ça explique cet nouvel , mais je faisait un rêve quasiment toujours le même ou je perdais mes dents et ou j’avais une barbe encore plus grosse que d’habitude , j’ai fait des recherches on m’a dit que cela signifiais la mort la mienne ou celle d’un proche , je sais que cheikh Oussama n’est pas un proche au sens propre mais je l’aime pour Allah énormément comme s’il faisait partie de ma propre famille voir plus.”

“En tout cas s’il était vraiment vivant et que les amerloques l’ont vraiment tué, je pense que hervé ghesquière et stéphane taponier ont du soucis à se faire…”

“If Osama is martyred then we are all Osama. And the march of struggle will inevitably continue.”

“I’ll cut the head of everyone who says Sheikh Osama is dead”

New Elegy from Ḥāmid Bin ‘Abdullah al ‘Alī: “To the Lion Shaykh Usāmah Bin Lāden, God Have Mercy”

“After the news of the killing of the Sheikh a sharp drop in oil prices and gold and silver. U.S. stock market is witnessing an unprecedented profit. How much are you [worth], O great Osama? Blessed, living and dead. What if all the heads of Arabs killed in one day were influenced by oil prices? Gold? Silver? The stock market?”

“The absence of trophy photos, like they had with zarqawi and saddam hussein’s sons, is highly suspicious.”

“Agggh!!! This news on TV is annoying. These sell out Muslims really piss me off. I hope that Allah (swt) raises them with their community of shaytaan who they chose to side with, make friends with and obey instead of His (swts) law in the duniyah. May these sell outs also be thrown into the lowest depths of Hell with no respite.”

“The denial of the Pakistani Taliban has been relayed by the Russian news agency, so nothing prevents us from asserting that denial. Since when Mujahideen use the Russian news agency to connect?”

“My father woke me with this news, I had tears…The worst is when I saw the Kuffar celebrate on TV, I felt lousy”

“The killing of Sheikh Osama bin Laden does not affect the progress of victory, God willing. After the death of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, Jihad did not stop. And went on…….. And went on……… And went on ………”

“God willing, it’s a lie and we should not rush in denying news media organizations patience patience. We do not believe them and will not believe, but our media only.”

“al-Qaeda are the people of the Victorious Sect, which recognizes the last of the banner to the Mahdi”

“Jihad will continue until the Day of Resurrection”

“If it is authentic [that] Osama [died], indiscriminate killing is the solution, is the solution, is the solution.”

“Sheikh Bin Laden is not dead! What a farce from the Tawaghit!!”

“Hope that this act will not go unpunished.”

“We have our horror when we heard of the way in which knowledge of the place of Sheikh Osama bin Laden. It has been suggested that the Guantanamo prisoner [KSM] is [the] one who gave the information that led to access to the martyed sheikh … It has already happened [before] … one ex-Guantanamo prisoner led to the achievement of discovering the operations of the parcel bombs launched by the Mujahideen brothers in Yemen. Similarly, in a number of things [it also] led to the deaths of many of the Mujahideen. Are Guantanamo prisoners disclosing the secrets of jihad and the mujahideen? … Are the Mujahideen in danger?”

_____

Sources:

http://as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=37753

http://aljahad.com/vb/showthread.php?t=5011

http://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=32988

http://as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=37755

http://forums.islamicawakening.com/f18/osama-bin-laden-killed-45497/

http://www.jhuf.net/showthread.php?10461-shaikh-osama-shaheed(hifzullah-alah)

https://www.islambruederschaft.com/blog/?p=3364

https://dawaalhaq.wordpress.com/2011/05/02/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%86/

http://www.ansar-alhaqq.net/forum/showthread.php?t=12709

http://www.aljahad.com/vb/showthread.php?t=5032

http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=37853

http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=37860

http://forums.islamicawakening.com/f18/taliban-says-shaykh-osama-alive-unconfirmed-news-45502/index2.html

http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=37884

http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=37892

http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=37925

http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=37932

http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=37946

Introduction to a series on Ibn Taymiyyah

April 9, 2011
Adam Gadahn, Anwar al-Awlaki, Dr. Akram Hijazi, Ibn Taymiyyah, Mardin

Although much of my current research focuses on the contemporary trends in jihadi intellectual thought, Western jihadi networks, and online jihadi activities; my passion on the side is understanding classical and medieval Islamic intellectual thought as a means to better understand the jihadi phenomenon in the context of the broad sweep of Islamic intellectual history. Therefore, I have taken a keen interest in understanding the life and work of Taqi ad-Din Ibn Taymiyyah since he is viewed by many Western terrorism analysts as well as jihadis as the foundation for jihadi ideology.

While writing my master’s thesis more than year ago, I discovered through the guidance of my graduate advisor as well as reading some of the academic literature that the basis for understanding Ibn Taymiyyah has been skewed as a consequence of much of his thought being filtered through Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, founder of “Wahhabism,” and the state religion of Saudi Arabia. This suggested that it was crucial to further investigate his thought unfiltered.

***

A group of ‘ulama convened a conference on March 27-28, 2010 in the city of Mardin, Turkey that revisited Ibn Taymiyyah’s famous fatwa on the status of the city of Mardin and whether it was in Balad al-Silm (land of peace) or Balad al-Harb (land of war). This fatwa was also previously examined (along with three other fatawa) in Yahya Michot’s excellent book Muslims under non-Muslim Rule: Ibn Taymiyya, which I reviewed for a forthcoming issue of the academic journal Terrorism and Political Violence. Therefore, I will not get into the substance of it here.

What makes this all important in terms of bridging the gap between the classical and medieval to the contemporary is that as a result of the conclusions made at the Mardin Conference, it irked some jihadis. I am only aware of Dr. Akram Hijazi, Adam Gadahn, and Anwar al-Awlaki’s rebuttal of the conference. If anyone is aware of others please pass the primary literature along.

As such, I believed I could try and fill a gap in the literature by examining the responses of contemporary jihadis to the conference in light of the primary and secondary literature on the actual fatwa. It is the hope of this author that it will help shed more light on the interaction between the historicity of the fatwa and what one could describe as an “imagined history.”

Thus, this author proposes to first blog about it as a way to expound his preliminary thoughts and receive open source peer review prior to submitting it to an actual peer reviewed journal. Not only will this be an innovative way of leveraging Web 2.0 technology with academic pursuits, but it will also hopefully foster a greater discourse and allow more access to this type of information.

***

Prior to delving into that discussion, I felt it was necessary to read more on Ibn Taymiyyah’s life and thought. During my research I came across a recently published edited volume titled Ibn Taymiyyah and His Times. While reading it I felt it would be worthwhile to share some of its insights on Ibn Taymiyyah.

As a prologue to an examination of jihadi responses to the challenge of the Mardin Conference, I will highlight in forthcoming posts valuable information from the edited volume that may help illuminate the complexities in Ibn Taymiyyah’s thought in a more sophisticated manner than much of the naïve proclamations about him in popular Western and jihadi accounts.

AQIM Statement Hoax?

April 4, 2011
Algeria, AQIM, France, Libya

Last night, Tout sur l’Algérie published an article titled “Aqmi affirme que ses éléments ont été tués dans ce raid” (“AQIM confirms that its members were killed in raid”). The article stated that they received through anonymous sources a new statement from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb that said that some of AQIM’s fighters were killed in an accidental NATO airstrike on rebels this past Friday. Although it is quite possible that this occurred, there is reason to be skeptical. First, the statement has still not been released to the forums (at least sixteen hours have passed as of 1:25PM US Central Time). I also do not recall a time when AQIM released a statement to anonymous sources in the past. Second, the article provided a screen shot of the top of the statement and it did not conform to the normal style, color, and font of previous AQIM statements.

Screen shot of Tout sur l'Algérie's screen shot of AQIM's statement

The top part with the black text (the basmallah) and the golden text (AQIM’s name in Arabic) are normal. The green text below it, though, is where the authenticity of the statement comes into question. In the past, AQIM has never used that font or green color for its statement titles. Rather, they have used red. Here are some examples of previous officially released AQIM statements:

Example 1

Example 2

Example 3

Based on the above examples and when one compares it to the one posted by Tout sur l’Algérie one can see a clear difference. Further, the green text appears to be photoshopped on top of the alleged AQIM statement.

There are other indications that it is not real. The first line of green text states the basmallah again, which does not make much sense since it is already articulated above, which suggests the individual who created it and tried to pass it off as real did a poor job trying to copy previous AQIM statements. The second line is the alleged name of the statement and translates to “Obituary of the Mujahidin in the Battle of “Bariqah.” Using the word obituary appears off and does not sound similar to jihadi lingo. One would think they would use the word shuhadaʾ (martyrs) instead.

This raises the question then, who and why would one want to perpetuate such a poorly executed hoax? Three countries came to mind: Algeria, Libya, and France. I asked al-Wasat’s co-editor Andrew Lebovich, a specialist on France and the Maghreb who works for Peter Bergen at the New America Foundation, in a private conversion what his thoughts were and who might be behind it. Lebovich does not believe the French passed the information along since they would have no reason to do so. With regard to Algeria, Lebovich stated that the Algerians are not too happy about the intervention because an unstable state next door is not good. He continued: “I think they are in a tough bind; their lives would be better with Qaddafi gone, but for the sake of their own internal security I think they would like to avoid more revolutions.” That said, he is still skeptical that they would forward such information because “if anyone should know what these [AQIM] documents look like, it’s the Algerians.” Lastly, Lebovich suggested that the Libyans may be behind it since “they’re smart, and know the Algerian press would take a statement like this.”

Since there is no clear evidence of who is behind this alleged statement and it has not appeared on the forums nor has AQIM released a statement refuting the information in the Tout sur l’Algérie article, at this point it would be unwise to point fingers. That said, based on what we know about AQIM there is strong evidence that the statement being trotted out was not actually from AQIM.

Review of Manuel R. Torres Soriano’s “The Road to Media Jihad- The Propaganda Actions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”

February 9, 2011
AQIM, Media Jihad, Terrorism and Political Violence

The most recent issue of Terrorism and Political Violence was released in January. As usual, it had an excellent collection of articles. In particular interest to me was the one written by Manuel R. Torres Soriano “The Road to Media Jihad- The Propaganda Actions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.” I thought it would be worthwhile to discuss it briefly since it somewhat dovetails with the spirit of this website.

Soriano provides a descriptive analysis of Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) media strategy from 1998-2009. This article fills an important lacuna in the literature since many in the Anglosphere have not focused much on GSPC and AQIM. As such, it provides a solid foundation for future researchers to build off of it. One can divide GSPC/AQIM’s media output into three phases: (1) under the leadership of Hassan Hattab and Nabil Sahraoui following the break from Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), 1998-2004; (2) under the leadership of Abdelmalek Droukdal prior to the merger with al-Qaeda, 2004-2007; and (3) post-merger with al-Qaeda 2007-2009.

Soriano adroitly points out that following the GSPC split from the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), unlike the GIA who were producing a lot of materials through its networks in Europe, the GSPC did not sustain these efforts. This was because Hattab was more interested in consolidating leadership and acknowledging the break with the GIA due to its very toxic actions in the latter half of the Algerian civil war. Therefore, the media component of the organization was not important to him. The GSPC’s first media output was in 1999 when they released a poor quality VHS tape that showed an ambush of Algerian soldiers. In 2003, Hattab was removed as the leader and the reigns were given over to Sahraoui who was only in charge of the group for a short period (September 2003-June 2004). Sahraoui was more concerned with stemming fitnah (discord) within GSPC than building up a media arm.

The second phase of GSPC/AQIM’s media endeavors began with the ascension of Abdelmalek Droukdal as the amir(leader) of GSPC. According to Soriano, “[he] accorded to the Propaganda Actions of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb group’s propaganda actions. The organisation’s new head had a much more ambitious vision of the role of communication within the overall group strategy.” At first, Soriano points out that the media operation did not change much due to lack of skilled individuals. That said, in October 2004, GSPC created its first website jihad-algeria.net. There was a huge gap between these efforts and the explosion of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s, amir of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) at the time, online presence during the same time period. Soriano points out a plea online from Abu Yasser Sayyaf, GSPC’s web-master, for any type of help, such as, uploading content and using different programs, which shows how far behind GSPC was technologically. Further proof of this amateurism was GSPC’s second video release “Apostate Hell,” released in September 2004. The video was only three minutes long and due to its lack of know-how, the watermark of the software they used, Honestech, was glossed over the video. Sayyaf’s excuse for this dismal media output as well as others in video and audio form was due to their remote locations in the mountains of Algeria.

Soriano notes that 84% of GSPC/AQIM’s releases have been written communiqués and 85% of those have been less than two pages. Unlike other groups that wrote long doctrinal texts of their aqidah (creed) GSPC did not have much religious legitimacy or heavyweights in their group especially since traditional Muslim clerics like Yusuf al-Qardawi, Salmon al-Awdah and Safir al-Hawali produced fatawa (legal rulings) delegitimizing the jihad in Algeria. Furthermore, as a result of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq where there were actual “crusader” militaries those conflicts took the limelight away from the Algerian theater. One example Soriano provides is the lack of excitement over GSPC’s creation of an online magazine al-Jama’a (the group) attempting to follow the model of the successfulSawt al-Jihad (voice of jihad) magazine produced by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that at the time was strictly in Saudi Arabia and had yet to merge with al-Qaeda in Yemen, which occurred in January 2009. al-Jama’awas not highlighted by the key online jihadist websites. Soriano also points out that its biggest deterring factor was because the magazine mainly focused on Algerian issues versus the international problems of the ummah (Islamic nation) and other theaters of jihad.

Another issue was with the credibility of the messaging from GSPC. Sometimes the forums published content that purported to be GSPC propaganda that actually was not directly from GSPC’s media wing. Soriano expanded upon this by stating: “A lack of coordination and the problems of communication between the different cells, the lack of authority exercised over certain elements that had split from the group or ‘‘orbited’’ around it, and the repercussions of the ‘black propaganda’ waged by the Algerian intelligence services forced the group to issue public denials of the authenticity of content broadcast in its name on several occasions.” As such, although GSPC’s efforts during the second phase to broaden its media apparatus allowed it to release more content than in the first phase, they still ran into a lot of difficulties along the way.

GSPC’s media fortunes began to turn around when al-Qaeda central (AQC) officially announced a merger with GSPC and they became AQIM. Immediately, AQIM’s media apparatus produced more content with better quality. Soriano attributes this change to AQIM following AQC’s model of “untiring” media output. Another key factor was the influence of AQI. Soriano also surmises that more media production could have been compulsory for GSPC if it were to merge with AQC as an official branch. That said, the steep upward tick in production value might have also to do with AQIM outsourcing its media production to Europe similar to GIA in the 1990s since the above examples I am unsure completely explain the huge change in a relatively short period of time. Lastly Soriano says that it was also a way for leadership to assert its power over some dissention that was going through the ranks that were not consulted and were also against the merger with AQC.

Furthermore, AQIM started to cultivate relations with top online jihadist fora to release their content as well as the jihadist distribution company al-Fajr (dawn) Media. Nevertheless, AQIM was still plagued with issues of unauthorized messages being released under its name. As a remedy, in October 2009, AQIM created al-Andalus Institute for Media Production to better authenticate their content so individuals couldn’t post information that wasn’t directly from AQIM. Soriano concludes the article by drawing a comparison between AQIM and AQC when they created their own media production apparatus As-Sahab (clouds) Institute for Media Production, also as a way to breathe new life in their media efforts and communications strategy.

This article provided important descriptive insight into the nature of GSPC/AQIM’s media strategy between 1998-2009. There are some areas, though, where further research could build off of this by either Soriano or another researcher. To go a step further, it would be worthwhile for one to look deeper into the content produced by AQIM and provide a textual analysis of their variety of communications over the years. Another interesting project might also try and compare descriptive analyses of the media histories of AQC, AQAP and AQI and determine whether there are any tipping points for each groups emergence as a larger player in the jihad field as well as other metrics that could help researchers and governmental officials measure the importance or impact of a rising or fading jihadist organization. That said, overall, Soriano’s article “The Road to Media Jihad- The Propaganda Actions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” is an excellent first step in developing more empirical research as it relates to the media jihad and further detail of AQIM in the English speaking world.

Check out my new article at The Atlantic: “Jihadists: “The Wallflowers of the Tunisian Uprising”

January 20, 2011
al-Qaeda, AQIM, Arab Uprisings, Tunisia

AQIM Pic2.jpg

In the wake of Tunisia’s popular uprising this past week, some are debating whether Twitter,WikiLeaks, or even George W. Bush might have played a role in enabling the historic protest movement. But one thing seems clear: The jihadist movement, which has long defined itself as Arab governments’ staunchest and most authentic opposition, had nothing to do with it. Jihadists’ non-involvement in organizing, encouraging, or even participating in the Tunisian protests suggests that the jihadist current has been largely irrelevant to Tunisia’s popular uprising. For as long as jihadists have been in business, one of their main goals has been to overrun an “apostate” Arab leader such as Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. But with the possible exception of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s 1981 assassination, they never came close. That Tunisia’s protesters succeeded where the jihadists so often fail, and appear not at all driven by anything close to jihadist ideology or even general religious grievances, has left members of the online jihadist community unsure how to respond. The uprising, after all, fulfills a top jihadist goal, but it also rebukes their belief that only violent and pious struggle can bring down a man like Ben Ali.

Two days before Ben Ali’s ousting, the amir (leader) of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Abu Mus’ab ‘Abd al-Wadud, released a statement titled “In Support of the Intifadah of our People in Tunisia.” He appealed to Tunisians, selling AQIM as an ally in their protests. “I found it a fit chance to inform you, on behalf of my Mujahideen brothers in the Islamic Maghreb, our partisanship and consolation with you. And our stand alongside you in your problem and uprising, with advice, inspiration and affirmation,” he wrote. “Your battle you fight today isn’t alienated from the general battle the Muslim Ummah is engaged in against its external and domestic enemies. … And I encourage our people in Tunisia to be ready and prepare preparations and send their sons to us to train on weapons and gain military expertise. … My Muslim brothers in Tunisia: your Mujahideen brothers are with you, and your problem is our problem and your happening is ours, and the bereaved isn’t like the adopting.”

The statement, an effort to attach AQIM to the Tunisians’ cause, has had no appreciable effect. After all, AQIM’s jihadist ideology, which has never been very popular in Tunisia anyway, has next to nothing in common with the protest movement. What small role Tunsians have played in the jihadist movement, and that the movement has played in Tunisia, only underscores their irrelevance in the country. On September 9, 2001, two Tunisians working with al-Qaeda helped assassinate Ahmad Shah Massud, the leader of the U.S.-allied Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Between August 2006 and August 2007, thirty-three Tunisians, just 5.5 percent of the total foreign fighters, joined al-Qaeda in Iraq, according to the recordsrecovered by U.S. coalition forces. Earlier this month, a Tunisian member of AQIM threw an explosive at a French embassy building in Mali, “lightly injuring” two people. A U.K.-based terrorism researcher, who asked to remain anonymous because his work has not been publicly published, estimated that Tunisians only account for 1-2% of the members in AQIM, which he said has “very limited operational capacity that they could project into Tunisia.”

As the protests mounted, jihadist activists outside of Tunisia have tried, and failed, to assert a role in the historic uprising. In the days before Ben Ali fled, Abu Tariq al-Tumi, a member of the Arabic-language jihadist forum the Majahidin Electronic Network (MEN), urged the “brothers” to contact friends in Tunisia over Facebook and make them aware of the importance of implementing Shari’ah law once the Tunisian regime fell. A video produced by Sharia4Belgium called for establishing a Tunisian Caliphate. Once Ben Ali left, forum members such as Ashaq al-Hur al-Tunisi, ecstatic that longtime enemy Ben Ali was finally defeated, also argued that now is the time to organize a Caliphate in Tunisia. Others, such as al-Khalifa al-Qadim, expressed shock that non-jihadist Tunisians could and would topple the secular Ben Ali. Azaf al-Rasas, another MEN member, downplayed the protests’ importance, predicting that little would ultimately change in Tunisia. In one particularly disturbing message, member Ri’bal posted a video educating Tunisians on the weapons and tactics they could use against “apostates.” Abu al-Munthir al-Shanqiti produced a fatwa for the influential Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad asserting that the Tunisian government’s “fight against Islam” was one of the main factors that led to the uprising.

At another prominent forum, the Ansar al-Mujahidin Arabic Forum, members have been overjoyed at President Ben Ali’s deposing and excited for what they see as an opportunity for the jihadist movement to make its mark on Tunisia. Khadijah al-Afghaniyyah urged Tunisians to “raise the banner of Islam” as seventh century Arab generals had in their “fatah” (conquests) of North Africa. Another member, Bint al-Sahabah, expressed hope that Tunisia would soon become the “Islamic Emirate of Kairouan,” named for the Tunisian city, founded by Arabs in 670 CE, which has become what some consider the fourth holiest city in Islam. One member asked whether mujahidin would step in to lead the uprising into a mass “jihad fi sabil illah” (jihad in the way of God) across North Africa and the Middle East. Another ominously warned that AQIM would be coming to Tunisia.

There’s not much credibility to these threats, though, as groups such as AQIM have little reach in Tunisia. But it’s telling that the members would be so eager to claim ownership over the protests, especially given how little involvement they actually have. Although jihadists have been passing around a YouTube videoextolling the creation of a Caliphate in Tunisia, scarcely any Tunisians, and no significant Tunisian organizations, have shown any real interest in replacing Ben Ali with such a government. Reading the jihadist forums, one often gets the sense that its memberships live in denial, believing that the righteous mujahidin are always one campaign away from toppling secular Arab dictators like Tunisia’s Ben Ali. As the jihadists watched a non-religious uprising finally succeed where they had failed for so long, it’s unsurprising they would retreat even further into visions of grandeur. In Tunisia at least, the jihadist call to arms has rarely seemed less relevant.