Check out my new article at The Atlantic: “Jihadists in Crisis”
The Caucasus Emirate, a global jihadist organization based in Russia’s Caucasus mountain region, functions much like similar groups across the world: it kills civilians and policemen; it attacks government centers, as it did during a recent assault on the Chechen Parliament in Grozny; and it issues frequent statements, often as videos posted to jihadi forums, to explain and spread its ideology. But the Caucasus Emirates’ recent statements, which are also a means of communication among disparate cells and fighters, appear to show a group increasingly consumed not by Chechen independence or by religious warfare, but by internal squabbles, power politics, and battles of succession. Beneath the posturing and rhetoric, the infighting has exposed and perhaps exacerbated an existential divide. Is the terrorist group, at its heart, a nationalist-Islamist organization focused on regional issues or a wing of the global jihadist movement led by al-Qaeda? It’s an abstract and difficult question that has at time troubled, and even fractured, similar groups across the Muslim world. The Caucasus Emirate’s ideological fissuring, though far from unprecedented, has played out in the near-total transparency of public statements and web forums, allowing us to reconstruct much of it blow-for-blow.
The Caucasus Emirate was first proclaimed in 2007 by Dokku Umarov, who calls himself the Emir. Umarov, who was president of the Chechen Republic of Ickheria in 2006 and 2007, established the Caucasus Emirates to bring the handful of disparate Islamic fronts operating across the Caucasus region together under one umbrella.
But Umarov’s leadership came into question this summer, launching a number of internal disputes that have still not been resolved. It began on July 24, when Umarov announced in a video that Aslambek Vadalov, the commander of the Eastern Front of the Armed Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, would succeed him immediately. Umarov said he strongly believed in the importance of clear lines of succession should he suddenly die. He urged his followers to pledge bay’at, a formal declaration of allegiance, to Vadalov and to follow his orders as new the Emir. This may appear to have been a forward-looking, even wise, decision on the surface, but Umarov’s call for bay’at may have been the moment that his pan-Caucasus Islamic alliance began to come undone.
A week later, Umarov followed up his earlier message with a stunning announcement: he was recanting his resignation, the announcement of which he claimed had been “fabricated.” He wrote in a message posted to the Caucasus Emirates official media mouthpiece Kavkaz Center, “The previous statement is canceled by my statement. The previous statement was completely fabricated.” In an apparent move to shore up Umarov’s support, Sayfullah Gubdensk, the Qadi (a judge certified to rule on Islamic law) of the Caucasus Emirate and the Emir of the Dagestan Front, released a statement urging fighters not to violate their bay’at to Umarov, who Gubdensk emphasized was the sole Emir of the Caucasus Emirate. In a separate message that same week, Vadalov announced that he was stepping down from the position of deputy Emir. A few days later, fighters from the Shamilkala Sector of the Dagestan Front publicly reaffirmed their loyalty oath to Umarov, suggesting that, despite the confusion, order was maintained in the ranks and Umaraov remained on top.
At the end of August, Umarov released a new video message explaining his resignation and what he seemed to describe as what had been a sudden change of heart. He said that during a meeting of high-level commanders, he had faced criticism for claiming responsibility for the March 2010 Moscow subway bombings and for not supplying his commanders with sufficient weapons, food, or other supplies. Conceding his failures to secure enough supplies, Umarov said he had offered at the meeting to step down. To prepare for his departure, he had recorded a video explaining Vadalov’s succession. But when the video found its way online, it contained an added statement from Vadalov, made alongside two other senior leaders: Khusayn Gakayev and an Arab, known only as Mukhannad, who is reportedly al-Qaeda’s liason in the North Caucasus. As Liz Fuller, who writes on the Caucasus for Radio Free Europe, explains: “[they] presented Umarov’s resignation as a done deed and expressed approval of Umarov’s imputed request to swear loyalty to Vadalov as his chosen successor.” As a result, Umarov believed Vadalov broke their agreement, leading Umarov to revoke his resignation.
In early October, two videos that had been originally recorded in August surfaced, detailing a growing rift between those loyal to Umarov and a breakaway contingent that had joined with Vadalov. In the first video, Vadalov, Gakayev, and a commander named Tarkhan Gaziyev rescinded their bay’at to Umarov. They said their main grievance was that Umarov had suspended the Majlis al-Shura, the Emirate’s consultative council, and had formed the Caucasus Emirate without first consultating with other senior leaders. They declared that Gakayev was now the Emir of Chechnya and that they no longer recognized Umarov, asserting that the fighters in Chechnya supported their decision. In a second video, the three men reiterated their loyalty to Gakayev, this time alongside other commanders. They listed all of the military leaders who they said had joined in recognizing Gakayev as their Emir. This suggests that Gakayev’s faction wanted to refocus the Caucasus Emirate on Chechen nationalist concerns rather than Umarov’s pan-Caucasus global jihadist vision.
Umarov responded not long after with a published decree eliminating the South-Western and Eastern Fronts, ordering all commanders to renew their bay’at to him, demanding Gakayev to hand over the money and supplies he’d been given, and giving Mukhannad one month to report to the Emir’s “court” over charges he had fomented fitnah, or discord within the ranks. Umarov also released a video denouncing all who rescinded their bay’at, saying they had lost their will for jihad.
The faction led by Vadalov and Gakayev may already be taking charge of terrorism operations within the Caucasus. The Institute for War and Peace Reporting’s Oliver Bullough told the BBC that the October 19 attacks on the Chechen Parliament in Grozny appeared to use some of the same tactics frequently deployed by Shamil Basayev, a Chechen rebel commander who died in 2006. If veterans from Basayev’s command are exercising greater control over operations in Chechnya, then it stands to reason that they will also steer ideology back to the pre-Caucasus Emirate emphasis on nationalism rather than global jihadism.
Complicating matters, two influential jihadist scholars, Syrian Abu Basir al-Tartusi who currently lives in London and Jordanian of Palestinian descent Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, have issued fatwas stating that Umarov is the true Emir. Their endorsements lend Umarov ideological legitimacy, especially among potential donors and recruits outside of the Caucasus.
Beneath the infighting, the splits within the Caucasus Emirate reveal an unresolved ideological dispute among the disparate cells and fighters that Umarov attempted to unify. On one side are the global jihadists, Umarov and his scholarly Arab backers, who see the region as another front in a global, ideological war against Western aggressors. On the other side are the Islamist-nationalists, Gakayev and a number of senior leaders, who are focused on resisting, and if possible gaining independence from, Russian rule. Though the two groups likely agree on far more than they disagree, it is a question of emphasis. Are they fighting for Islam or for Chechnya?
There have been many other high-profile terrorist feuds: Abdullah Azzam against Ayman al-Zawahiri over the future of the jihadist movement after the Afghan war against the Soviets; within the al-Qaeda Senior Leadership over tactics in Iraq; and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi against Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, also over Iraq. This dispute in the Caucasus, between the global jihadists and the nationalist-Islamists, reveals the same ideological fissure that has opened within several jihadist groups and in several countries since the 1990s: is the movement chiefly interested in waging local battles or a global war? That question, and the inner tension it brings, may be fundamentally irresolvable; Osama bin Laden himself, the preeminent global jihadist, began his career aiding anti-Soviet nationalists in Afghanistan. Whichever cause dominates, the terrorist attacks and guerilla campaigns in the Caucacus will likely continue unabated.
Check out my new blog post at al-Wasat: “Jihadism and the ‘Ulama”
Two days ago, J.M. Berger of IntelWire wrote an article describing a recent trend in the statements and video releases published by Adam Gadahn and Anwar al ‘Awlaki that have tried to discredit the ‘ulama (religious scholars). These ideas, though, are not new, but provide further example of a trend, which has pervaded some of the key Jihadist intellectual thinkers in the post-Caliphate era (the Caliphate was abolished in 1924).
Today, Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brothers in 1928, would not be considered a global jihadist, but his ideas became a foundation for later thinkers to build off of and further radicalize his thought. al-Banna did not understand how the ‘ulama could do nothing in the face of what he percieved was happening to the Muslim world. He viewed the Muslim Brothers’ values as a refutation of the values of al-Azhar University (the most respected Sunni place of high education) and how the university dealt with contemporary issues. The late Richard P. Mitchell, a scholar at the University of Michigan and author of The Society of the Muslim Brothers, summed up al-Banna’s thought on the ‘ulama, stating:
Azhar had persisted in a time-worn, anachronistic approach to Islam and its teachings—dry, dead, ritualistic, and irrelevant to the needs of living Muslims.[1]
Sayyid Qutb, who is viewed as the godfather of the modern jihadist movement, was critical of the ‘ulama as well. He believed they were opportunists that were using religious texts to their own advantage, which is pretty rich coming from Qutb, a man that has a degree in literature and created his own innovative way of understanding Islam.[2] Even more zealous over the problems with the ‘ulama was Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Farrag, who coined the term the near enemy as well as led the group Tanzim al-Jihad (later Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat. These are his thoughts from his book Jihad: The Neglected Duty:
There are some who say that what we should do now is busy ourselves with seeking knowledge, for how can we struggle in the cause of Allah while we are lacking the knowledge, which is fard(obligatory) to seek? But we have not heard anyone who says that it is permitted to abandon an Islamic order or an obligation of the obligations of Islam because of knowledge, especially if this obligation is Jihad. So how can we abandon a fard ‘ayn (individual obligation) because of fard kifayah (collective obligation)? … So he who says that knowledge is Jihad must realize that what isfard is fighting … If a person wants to increase his knowledge … he could do so, because there are no restrictions on knowledge, which is available for everybody. But to delay Jihad because of seeking knowledge is an evidence of the one who has no evidence … However, we do not underestimate knowledge and scholars, rather we call for that. But we do not use it as evidence to abandon the obligations that Allah ordained.[3]
More recently, Osama bin Laden argued:
Despite of this hard siege imposed on you O my Islamic Ummah, you still have a great opportunity to regain your freedom to go out of the submission to and the dependence of this Crusader/Zionist alliance. To reach that, you should free yourself from the fetters of humiliation and subservience shackling us by the agents of this alliance who are our countries’ governors and their helpers especially the fetters of the Ulamaa of the Sultan, as well the fetters of the Islamic groups which transform their method to recognize the governor who betrayed the religion and the Ummah, and they join the political process of the state of this governor, and no difference for them if they are in the rule or opposition.[4]
Further, last month, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri stated:
This orientation has the purer methodology and the more correct doctrine, because it relies on the explicit and definite proofs of the Qur’an and Sunnah [Prophetic Way], and cites the historical and political reality of the Muslim Ummah, and believes neither in the fatwas of the “Fuqahaa” of the Marines nor in the hired ‘Ulama in Riyadh, Cairo and Qatar.[5]
Finally, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the Jordanian cleric who mentored Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and is considered the most influential living global jihadist theorist, has written about what he describes as the murji’ah (non-righteous scholars) on several occasions. Here are a couple examples:
I advise them not be deceived by the ambiguities of the phony scholars, who confuse the truth with falsehood and confuse the path to Paradise with the path to Hellfire.[6]
The Mujahideen do not need you, half men and with no resolve. They do not need any advice onJihad from scholars who are paid for and defeated. They do not need to ask you if it is okay with you or if their Jihad is compatible with you thinking. No, they do not need that. They have all the wisdom and the vision that they need. Die in your anger, and continue your criticism of the Mujahideen. You cannot destroy their resolve; your poisoned pins would not affect their Jihad. Nothing will affect them.[7]
Added up, one can see that individuals involved with the jihadist movement have tried to discredit the ‘ulama for quite some time now. One of the goals is to weaken state institutions linked to corrupt governments, as well as weakening potential enemies. Another is due to the lack of true religious legitimacy by many in the movement. As such, they are compensating and trying to discredit individuals who are trained in the religion and understand that their understanding of Islam is not based on the classical tradition.
–
[1] Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993), 212-213.
[2] Roxanne Leslie Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 133.
[3] Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Farrag, Jihad: The Neglected Duty (Birmingham, UK: Maktabah Al Ansaar Publications, 2000), 46-48.
[4] Osama bin Laden, The Way To Rescue Palestine (As-Sahab Media Productions, 2008).
[5] Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, A Victorious Ummah, A Broken Crusade: Nine Years After the Start of the Crusader Campaign (As-Sahab Media Productions, 2010).
[6] Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, A message in support of the Mujahideen in Somalia and exposing the doubts created the Ullamah of Dajjaal (Minbar Tawhid W’al Jihad, 2009).
[7] Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, The Caravan is Moving and the Dogs are Barking (Minbar Tawhid W’al Jihad).
Analysis of Anwar al ‘Awlaqī: “To Make it Known and Clear to Mankind, and Not to Hide it”
The video was first previewed a few weeks ago on the forums and was covered by IntelWire’s J.M. Berger. The above title is in reference to the Qur’ānic verse 3:187 (HT Online Jihad):
“And remember Allah took a covenant from the People of the Book, to make it known and clear to mankind, and not to hide it; but they threw it away behind their backs, and purchased with it some miserable gain! And vile was the bargain they made!”
Unfortunately, the asbāb al-nuzūl (occasions of revelation) for this verse is not explained by al-Wāḥidī. That said, I thought it would be worthwhile to provide some tafāsīr (Qur’ānic exegesis) from some leading Muslim mufassirūn (those who conduct Qur’ānic exegesis) in Islamic history with regard to the above verse, which might provide added layer to our understanding of why al ‘Awlaqī decided to use it as his title:
al-Tustarī:
That is, they [The Jews and Christians] did not act by the Book, and purchased with it some miserable gain, that is, they bought in exchange for the everlasting Hereafter, the goods of this transitory world.
Jalālayn:
And, mention, when God made covenant with those who had been given the Scripture, that is, the pledge [taken] from them in the Torah, ‘You shall expound it (read tubayyinunnahu, or yubayyinunnahu, ‘they shall expound it’) the Book, to people, and not conceal it’ (read taktumūnahu, ‘you shall not conceal it’, or yaktumūnahu, ‘they shall not conceal it’). But they rejected it, they discarded the covenant, behind their backs, and so they did not act in accordance with it, and bought with it, they took in its place, a small price, of this world from the debased among them, enjoying supremacy over them in knowledge, and they concealed it, lest it [the supremacy] escape them; how evil is what they have bought, [how evil is] this purchase of theirs!
Ibn ‘Abbās:
Then Allah mentioned His covenant with the people of the Book in the Scripture, which required them to exposit the traits and description of His Prophet, saying: (And (remember) when Allah laid a charge on those who had received the Scripture) i.e. the Torah and the Gospel ((He said): Ye are to expound it) the trait and description of Muhammad (to mankind and not to hide it) not to hide these traits and description of Muhammad in their Scripture. (But they flung it behind their backs) and did not act upon it (and bought thereby a little gain) a paltry acquisition in their means of living by hiding the traits and description of Muhammad in their Scripture. (Verily evil is that which they have gained thereby) evil is that which they have chosen for themselves: Judaism and the concealment of the traits and description of Muhammad.
Ibn Kathīr:
(And remember) when Allah took a covenant from those who were given the Scripture (Jews and Christians) to make it (the truth) known and clear to mankind, and not to hide it, but they threw it away behind their backs, and purchased with it some miserable gain! And indeed worst is that which they bought.)
On the less esoteric front, one would be remiss not to mention that al ‘Awlaqī’s new video is not produced by al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) media outlet al-Malāḥim. Does this prove my point that he is not all that important to AQAP? I am always up for eating humble pie and though I still believe my argument is valid my colleague who goes under the pseudonym Mr. Orange’s War Tracker makes what I think is a valid counter-argument: “I’d say it’s the other way round. al ‘Awlaqī doesn’t need AQAP. And it’s still possible that he doesn’t even belong to their lot.” If his argument ends up being correct, as I responded to him, it could suggest that al ‘Awlaqī is trying to set himself up as a figure similar to Abū Muḥmmad al-Maqdisī. Interestingly, his speech is in Arabic and not English. Much of al ‘Awlaqī’s material in the past has been in English, as such, it could be argued that al ‘Awlaqī is trying to become more available to an Arab audience as well as gain more legitimacy. At the same time, al ‘Awlaqī calls for his video to be translated into English, therefore, he is trying to satiate his cult-like followers in the English-speaking world as well.
Thoughts and Analysis on Gadahn’s new video
“The young often realize the truth before the old and that laymen often recognize the truth ahead of the scholars.” – Adam Gadahn
For the second time in three weeks, Adam Gadahn has released a video message, this one titled “The Arabs And Muslims: between the Conferences of Desertion .. and the individual Duty of Jihād.” In it he uses the Mardin Conference, which was held this past March as a springboard to discuss the importance of jihād as being an individual duty (farḍ al-‘ayn) upon Muslims. I would like to highlight a few points:
From the Ashes of Iraq
Gadahn first directs his attention toward Arabs. Gadahn is trying to refocus Arabs and show them what is at stake: “Return once again to the call … and finish what you started.” Further, he argues that the possibility of mistakes and transgressions by the mujāhidīn is not an excuse to abandon the individual obligation of jihād: “A mistake isn’t treated by an even bigger mistake.” He affirms that these mistakes are not even close to the level of the transgression of the Crusaders and its proxies. This further reiterates the idea that following Abū Muṣ’ab al-Zarqāwī’s bloodlust in Iraq most Arabs were completely revulsed by AQ and they are still digging their way out of that mess.
‘Awlakī and “Lone-Wolfism”
Footage of Anwar al-’Awlakī from a previous AQAP video release appears interspersed with Gadahn’s message. This could suggest that AQSL believes ‘Awlakī has become an asset to their cause. If this is the case, then one has to only look at ourselves, specifically the mainstream media and non-expert pundits who have hyped him up to the point where he could be seen by AQSL as an important tactical tool in their arsenal. It is a sad state of affairs that a guy who was mid-level AQAP at best has in only eleven months become so much more than his actual worth or standing in the wider AQ movement. One should look to J.M. Berger’s take on ’Awlakī’s appearance in the video, which is a valid counterpoint to my above statement.
Gadahn also endorses the “lone-wolf” model that ‘Awlakī and his American pal Samīr Khān, the creator of Inspire Magazine, have called for recently, which was originally postulated by Abū Muṣ’ab al-Sūrī. Gadahn stated: “Don’t wait for some else, to do what you can do yourself.” To embolden potential recruits further, Gadahn continued: “Here you are in the battlefield.” Gadahn also provided examples of who “lone-wolf’s” should take as an example: Muḥammad Aṭā (9/11), Ṣidīque Khān (7/7), Muḥammad Būyīrī (Theo Van Gogh), Niḍāl Ḥassān (Fort Hood), ‘Umar Fārūq ’Abd al-Muṭallib (Christmas Day), and Faiṣal Shahzād (Times Square).
Veiled Snipe at Recanters
Toward the end of Gadahn’s statement he directs a message to those who have recanted. He does not directly say anyone or a particular group, but one could infer he was speaking to Sayyid ‘Imām ash-Sharīf (Dr. Fadl), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), or others. He argues that the movement still is in need of their expertise and efforts. He tries to remind them of the good old days by articulating that those involved now are the sons of the second and new generation, which are indebted to their previous efforts. Gadahn concludes: “Finish what you started, and aid your religion and ummah.”
Mardin and Ibn Taymīyyah
Fundamentally, the thing that should be taken away from this video is that the Mardin conference is a thorn in the side of AQ since it delegitimizes the foundation of much their theoretical work and raison d’être. This is the epitomy of the so-called “war of ideas.” Since AQSL is taking this message on they most likely feel threatened by its message and clarification of Taqī ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyyah’s fatwā (legal opinion/decree) at Mardin (see first conclusions 1-7 here).
As is highlighted by the quote at the top of this analysis, Gadahn and AQ are in an uphill battle since they do not have classically trained religious and scholarly credentials. Gadahn also undermines his argument when he discusses the importance of Ibn Taymīyyah to the AQ movement. He states that those who are carrying out the obligation of jihād are not relying or following Ibn Taymīyyah in the first place in issues of jihād or other things. Instead, they have their own fiqh(jurisprudence), ‘ulamā’ (religious scholars), and books, which they abide by far away from the Ḥanbalī legal school (there are four Sunnī legal schools). For example, Gadahn says the commanders and scholars of the Ṭālibān in AfPak are from the Ḥanafī legal school and would therefore not take their ideas from Ibn Taymīyyah. That is a slight of hand, though. To those who have no background in the madhhab’s (legal schools) then one might take Gadahn’s statement at face value. As the well respected Islamic scholar Shaykh ‘Abd al-Hakīm Murād explained:
It was at that time [circa 11th century], too, that the attitude of toleration and good opinion between the Schools became universally accepted. This was formulated by Imām al-Ghazālī, himself the author of four textbooks of Shāfi‘ī fiqh, and also of Al-Mustasfa, widely acclaimed as the most advanced and careful of all works on uṣūl,uṣūl al-fiqh fīl madhhab. With his well-known concern for sincerity, and his dislike of ostentatious scholarly rivalry, he strongly condemned what he falled ‘fanatical attachment to a madhhab’. While it was necessary for the Muslim to follow a recognised madhhab in order to avert the lethal danger of misinterpreting the sources, he must never fall into the trap of considering his own school categorically superior to the others. With a few insignificant exceptions in the late Ottoman period, the great scholars of Sunnī Islam have followed the ethos outlined by Imām al-Ghazālī, and have been conspicuously respectful of each others madhhab. Anyone who has studied under traditional ‘ulamā’ will be well-aware of this fact.
As such, Gadahn is either way out of his league or he does not recognize this precedent since he articulated that AQ has in effect their own legal school above. From this, one can see that the Mardin Conference caused Gadahn to enumerate apologética for his and AQ’s understanding of Islām. The question is who is winning this battle of ideas, the classically trained ‘ulamā’ or the global jihadist ‘ulamā’? I will have more to say about this at a later date.
Abū Muṣ’ab al-Sūrī and the Invasion of Afghanistan
I have been reading the abridged version of Abū Muṣ’ab al-Sūrī’s book The Global Islamic Resistance Call (Da’wat al-Muqāwamah al-Islāmīyyah al-’Alāmīyyah) edited by Jim Lacey and came across an interesting passage when discussing the history of the Tunisian jihadist movement:
They did not have much interest in the battle of the Taliban and the Muslim principality, and they were hesitant to get involved with the Taliban government or to consider it a religious legal leader in Afghanistan … They were also not convinced of the attempts bin Laden and al Qaida were making, nor of the latter’s military unidirectional penchant. Indeed, this was the case with the majority of the organizations and the Arab groups in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, despite all of these facts, when the American attacks occurred, every one of them got involved in that battle.
This reminded me of a recent tweet from Leah Farrall:
I wonder when, if ever, we’ll start talking about how we made AQ’s day, with Afghanistan, then Iraq.
I’m not sure whether Farrall is referencing al-Sūrī’s observation that the American invasion brought together a bunch of disparate nationalist-jihadist movements into al-Qā’idah’s global jihadist mold or that it led the United States into an economically bloodletting war. Either way, it raises an interesting question that has not been discussed much: what role the invasion of Afghanistan had on bringing many of the nationalist-jihadist groups — that were solely training in Afghanistan during the Ṭālibān’s rule to overthrow their own local regimes — over to al-Qā’idah’s side.
Addendum: It should be noted that I am not necessarily saying that we should not have invaded Afghanistan, rather it is just something to think about.
Check out my new article at The Atlantic: “How We’ve Changed al-Qaeda”
Last week, news agencies around the world reported that a plot hatched in the Pakistani tribal regions was aiming to conduct a “Mumbai-style” attack in London and major cities in France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium. Since then, each day has brought new revelations about its extent and scope. In the past, jihadists targeting the West have used spectacular, carefully synchronized suicide bomb attacks on various modes of transportation or in highly populated areas. But the reported plan to mimic the 2008 Mumbai attack, in which Pakistani gunmen shot at civilians in “soft” targets such as hotels and restaurants, reveals an important shift for al-Qaeda. Pressured by the increased effectiveness of Western governments’ counterterrorism efforts and learning from its string of recent failed bomb attempts, al-Qaeda is adapting its tactics.
Since the July 7, 2005, attack in London, in which coordinated suicide bombings targeted commuter buses and trains, there has not been a large-scale jihadist attack on Western soil. (The obvious exception, the March 2010 suicide bombings in Moscow subways, was more about Chechen separatism than global jihadism.) The U.S. and European leadership have adjusted their counterterrorism measures by enacting new laws to better prosecute terrorists, sharing more intelligence, monitoring terrorist cells more effectively, disrupting training camps in the Pakistani tribal areas, just to name a few. Since then, though the terrorists are still plotting, the success rate for their attacks has dropped precipitously.
One of the most important changes is al-Qaeda’s deteriorating ability to train and deploy bomb-makers. Prior to 9/11 and, later, during al-Qaeda’s regrouping in the Pakistani tribal regions from 2004-2008, the group had the time and breathing room to effectively train its operatives in bomb making. Its training camps lasted at least a month, with some trainees even going on to a kind of graduate school for advanced bomb making. But President Bush’s invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of Sept. 11 and, later, President Obama’s ramped up drone strikes severely disrupted their ability to openly train operatives over an extended period of time. Al-Qaeda was forced to outsource much of its training to local Pakistani groups that had mobile training camps, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and Lashkar-e-Janghvi. But these groups lack al-Qaeda’s expertise and their abbreviated training is less effective. Faisal Shahzad, the Time Square bomber, received five days of bomb-making training from a Pakistani group but, as evidenced by his failed bomb, which included bales of non-flammable fertilizer, he clearly did not know what he was doing.
Further, these developments also raised the status of the Yemen and Somalia battlefield since they provided alternative locations to train individuals while not being harassed, as they would be in the Pakistani tribal areas.
With suicide bombings no longer an ideal or practical option, it should be no surprise that al-Qaeda is seeking to mimic the 2008 attack in Mumbai. It was classic urban warfare, involving ten attackers conducting ten simultaneous bombing and shooting attacks across Mumbai. Some took hostages as well. Prior to the assault, the conspirators used GPS to familiarize themselves with the locations of their targets. In the aftermath, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Director of the Center for the Study of Terrorist Radicalization at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, explained the logic of the attack over a suicide bombing: because the attack could be drawn out over several hours or days, it forced the closure of much of Mumbai, an economic hub for India. If a similar attack shuttered one or more European capitals for a day, the economic repercussions would be significant and global.
The ease of the Mumbai attack on “soft” targets likely appeals to terrorist groups plotting attacks within the open societies of the West. As Malou Innocent emphasized in a recent article in The National Interest, a key passage in Bob Woodward’s new book Obama War’s reports that the Mumbai attack became a game-changer for the U.S. intelligence community. They realized that this type of attack could also occur in the United States – and that it was much tougher to detect or disrupt. I am sure al-Qaeda noticed, too.
Of course, even if al-Qaeda is expanding its tactical arsenal it does not necessarily mean it will not attempt suicide attacks in the future. The group has always been a fluid and dynamic organization that exploits every potential opportunity. For the time being, however it appears to have bent to outside pressure. While its move away from suicide bombings is a welcome reprieve, al-Qaeda’s highly adaptive and nimble nature virtually ensures it will continue to plague Western governments for years to come.
Analysis of Osama Bin Laden’s: “Stop the Method of Relief Work”
Usāmah Bin Lāden has released a new audio statement today titled “Stop the Method of Relief Work.” I would like to address this title first as there has been some interesting discussion about it on twitter this morning with Leah Farrall and Florian Flade. The English language forum Anṣār al-Mujāhidīn incorrectly translated the statement as “Some Points regarding the method of relief work.” As I articulated they did so most likely because the actual title could be misconstrued as UBL saying to stop relief efforts in Pakistan because it was God’s punishment against the Pakistani people for not instituting Islamic law, etc. boiler plate rhetoric. Rather, the way one should interpret the title of the statement is stop with the current method of relief work because there is another way of doing it, which he then proceeds to outline in the audio, but he is not saying stop relief efforts. Just stop the particular method that has been used.
I’m not going to delve deep into the actual content of this message since I think the implications are more important. In the actual message itself he highlights the problems of global warming, poor agricultural practices, and the importance of better relief efforts for the Pakistanis and Muslim ummah. For more on the content, read Florian Flade’s blog as well as a brief write-up from the BBC.
Although Leah Farrall in a quick-take post on this audio message highlights al-Qā’idah’s past aversion to relief work I believe that is no longer the case at least rhetorically. As Jarret Brachman has been stating for some time now and yesterday reiterated, al-Qā’idah Central’s main role is no longer as a terrorist organization:
Al-Qaeda has transformed in recent years from a terrorist organization (illegal) that haphazardly used media to advance their cause (not illegal) to a media organization (not illegal) that haphazardly uses terrorism to advance their cause (illegal). In other words, by reconceptualizing their illegal organization into a legal movement, they managed to rope in thousands, if not tens of thousands of new followers. This reconceptualization, by sheer numbers, structurally flipped the ratio of their labor hours from being 3/4 illegal stuff (terrorist operations) and 1/4 legal stuff (media operations) to 1/4 illegal stuff (terrorist operations) and 3/4 legal stuff (propaganda operations).
This statement from UBL would further suggest this transition. Also, if one looks at the pattern of the most recent messages from al-Qā’idah’s main leaders one can see more of an emphasis on relief work and environmental issues. Two days ago, Adam Gadahn released a video message titled “The Tragedy of the Floods” and two weeks ago Ayman al-Zawahiri “A Victorious Ummah, A Broken Crusade,” which highlighted the importance of relief efforts while fighting the Jihād. Further, UBL has discussed environmental issues in the past, therefore this is not completely new. This time he is adding relief work and agriculture to the mix. This past January, UBL’s statement discussed issues related to global warming. In addition, he also talked about global warming in a release in September 2007.
Overall, one can conclude from this that this is yet another example of al-Qā’idah’s efforts to rebrand itself in the aftermath of the slaughter in Iraq, which revulsed much of the Arab and Muslim world. Moreover, the CTC report that stated that al-Qā’idah’s attacks killed Muslims 85% of the time brought light to the hypocrisies of the organization that purported to be at war with the “Zionist-Crusaders” and not a war between al-Qaeda and Muslims. Although most Muslims did not read this report it was fairly obvious to them too who al-Qā’idah killed most of the time. Therefore, al-Qā’idah has tried to be a more inclusive organization and part of this rebranding is a softer message such as this one. At the same time, one should not be fooled by this. Brachman correctly points out the problem in this strategy:
The challenge is that for as much as AQ continues trying to build itself into an inclusivist social movement, it keeps slamming its head into the big brick wall of reality that AQ is founded on exclusivist, elitist doctrine and methodology. Any organization with Ayman al-Zawahiri at the top is by definition the opposite of populist. This is the fundamental contradiction that AQ cannot escape, no matter how much they ask Muslims to donate to earthquake relief funds or rockslide relief funds or talk about climate change. AQ offers nothing more than empty rhetoric and elitism.
Check out my new article at Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel: “What if Obama’s Yemen policy works?”
In the past month, Yemen has returned to the spotlight. The CIA now believes that the Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a larger security threat to the United States than al Qaeda Central in Pakistan. Since then, press accounts have stated that the United States government plans to carry out drone attacks in Yemen, and reported that U.S. Central Command plans to give $1.2 billion in aid to Yemen’s military over a five-year period. But such policies, no matter how well-intentioned, are unlikely to solve the very real challenges posed by al Qaeda’s presence in Yemen and may well make the situation worse.
It originally appeared that there was widespread consensus in the government on providing such military aid to Yemen. But a recent article in the New York Times highlights that there is a vigorous debate within the Obama administration about the efficacy of such aid. The Obama administration has been debating the legality of droning an American citizen (i.e. Anwar al-Awlaki). Before rushing into a major new program, it’s worth recalling the reasons why past U.S.-backed efforts aimed at eliminating al Qaeda’s presence in Yemen have failed.
Efforts to aid the Yemeni government against AQAP have done little to help solve some of Yemen’s larger societal problems, including water shortages, declining oil supplies, refugee and IDP problems, population growth, rebellion in the north, and a secessionist movement in the south. Indeed, increased military aid could actually exacerbate the already pervasive military culture in Yemen and cement the war economy, and intensify the grievances of citizens from the rebellion led by the Huthis in the north and the secessionist southern movement in the south. This is problematic because Yemen’s President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh views those conflicts as more of a threat to his power than AQAP and may well be tempted to use counterterrorism assistance against them. If this were the case, as Brian O’Neil argues, this would severely undermine the United States’ efforts.
Drone strikes are often proposed as an effective method for targeting AQAP’s leadership. But such strikes in Yemen could lead to many innocent civilian deaths without having a significant impact on AQAP’s leadership. The debate about their effect in Pakistan, which reveals a deep tension between military utility and potentially negative political effects, may be even more intense in Yemen.
The only reported drone strike in Yemen since President Obama came into office was the Dec. 17, 2009 strike on the community of al-Ma’jalah in the Abyan governorate in southern Yemen, which killed 41 civilians and 14 members of al Qaeda, but no one of importance. Consequently, AQAP used this drone strike as the reason for the attempted Christmas Day attack conducted by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, en route from Amsterdam to Detroit.
This, however, was not the first time drones have been used in Yemen. In November, 2002, the Bush administration conducted a drone strike which killed the leader of the group then known as al Qaeda in Yemen, Abu ‘Ali al-Harithi, which also killed American citizen Kamal Derwish (Ahmed Hijazi). This reportedly hobbled the organization for some time, but as Gregory Johnsen points out: “this is not 2002 and if the U.S. thinks that by taking out [AQAP leaders] al-Wahayshi, al-Shihri or al-Raymi it can do what it did when it killed al-Harithi it is sadly mistaken. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will survive the deaths of any one of those individuals and possible the deaths of all three.”
The politics are treacherous. Launching drone strikes could hinder efforts to solve the northern and southern conflict peacefully. As Gregory Johnsen has warned, conducting drone strikes in Yemen could entangle the United States in tribal conflicts, which would further draw the United States into Yemen’s internal matters, as well as inflame other challenges to the Yemeni government such as the southern insurrection and the Huthi rebellion.
If the United States tried to target an AQAP operative in a Huthi stronghold in northern Yemen and accidentally killed individuals who sympathize with the Huthi cause, it would most likely break the fragile peace and lead to a resumption and major escalation of war between the Huthis and the Yemeni government. Further, in the past round of battle from August, 2009 to February, 2010, Saudi Arabia — which collects a large amount of American military aid — overtly entered the war. A small counterterrorism operation could quickly spiral into a regional war that has nothing to do with AQAP, but could further destabilize the security situation in Yemen and detract from the fight against AQAP.
One has to also consider the rise in recent months of violence between AQAP operatives and Yemeni security forces, which has mainly occurred in southern Yemen as well as the recent uptickin violence by the Yemeni government against the southern movement. This could potentially lead southerners to establish closer ties to AQAP, even though each group has different goals. AQAP has already tried to co-opt the southern movement’s banner for cessation, though, under the framework of an Islamic Emirate when releasing a message titled “Message to Our People in the South.” As the leader of AQAP, Nasir al-Wahayshi, states: “We in the al Qaeda network support what you are doing: your rejection of oppression practiced against you and others, your fight against the government and your defending yourself.” As of now, there is no evidence of collusion between the two groups even if the Yemeni government argues otherwise. The southern movement has rejected overtures from AQAP in the past. But if the Yemeni government continues to conflate the southern movement with AQAP and further violence is directed toward the southern movement, it could lead to an alliance of convenience.
Another issue has to do with the legality of targeting an American citizen. How the Obama administration decides to handle the situation with Anwar al-Awlaki will shed light on the United States’ legal policy vis-à-vis the war on terror. Will it lead the United States down a slippery slope that further erodes the rule of law and its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community? Or, will it affirm Obama’s statement in his inaugural address: “we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals.”
Finally, the United States should not be surprised if AQAP tries to respond to drones by attacking the homeland as it nearly did with the Christmas Day failure. What if AQAP was successful? As Greg Scoblete succinctly points out: “the call for America to push aside its weak local partner and take care of the problem itself will only grow louder.” Will the United States then expand its aid to deal with Yemen’s other domestic issues – governance, infrastructure, education, healthcare, and economic development? Or potentially put boots on the ground? That would only further entrench the United States in a complex society that it truly does not understand; and, as we have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, that leads to greater trouble.
But what if pouring $1.2 billion of military aid into Yemen buttressed by a drone offensive against AQAP works? Obviously, one hopes the United States is successful in dismantling AQAP and that it does not repeat the same mistakes it made in 2003 by taking its eyes off of al Qaeda’s presence in Yemen. But, it is hard to envision the United States completely succeeding since President Saleh has an incentive to keep AQAP alive. Between 2003 and 2006 the United States reduced its military aid significantly. As such, President Saleh views AQAP as a tool to continue to get attention from the United States even at the expense of his nation.
The United States should encourage Yemen to peacefully resolve the conflicts in the north and south as well as address the grievances these groups have, which would free up resources to tackle other pressing issues. The United States should also do the following: take a lead in a new international donor fund initiative for development and reducing poverty, but unlike in the pastmake sure donors follow through; continue its low-profile training of Yemen military officials; support efforts to diversify Yemen’s economy, which relies heavily on unsustainable depleting oil resources; promote international aid programs to help the more than 300,000 IDP’s and refugees; and stimulate reform efforts in the political, judicial, educational, infrastructural, and medical realm to better serve Yemen’s citizens. This may marginalize AQAP by taking away potential rhetorical points, leading to its eventual defeat.
Aaron Y. Zelin is a research assistant in the politics department at Brandeis University and blogs atJihadology.
Summary and Analysis of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s new video release “On The Occasion of Ramadan Fighting is Ordained for You”
Friend of the blog Nasser Weddady, a native Mauritanian, summarized and provided local knowledge analysis of AQIM’s most recent video release “On The Occasion of Ramadan Fighting is Ordained for You” to me through twitter. He said:
- watching the video the dudes in the first minutes are Mauritanians with a clear Hassaniya accent..figures we’re more literary
- one of the guys was reciting a hassaniya poem
- it’s funny to see Mauritanians reciting Qur’an in Hafs instead of warsh.. so alien to us.. clearly Saudi influence in action
- minute 30, showing an Afro-Mauritanian preaching in Halpulaar (fulani) very worrying sign..
- minute 33 a Touareg preaching in his language face uncovered.. another alarm sign
- minute 41, Guinean preaching in Portuguese..
- min 43 AQIM dude preaching in .. Haussa..
- part one of the new video is basically AQIM bragging about the diversity of its recruits and a show of success recruiting touaregs
- beginning of video 2 AQIM emphasizing their diversity i.e trying to spread the msg & grow it beyond Arabs
- min 43, in the hassaniya poem the guy says in rhyme that the group in that location has 14 fighters.
- the Hassaniya poem in part 2 shows a good deal of sophistication trying to appeal to Moorish youth. psy-ops
- the propaganda is designed to appeal to young moors warrior ethos.. not to be confused with jihadism..much more complex sociology
- minute 60 of the video: gives previously unknown names of 4 Muaritanian AQIM members gone KIA.
Obviously one cannot take everything in a propaganda video at face value, at the same time, AQIM is trying to show it has diversified its ranks and is no longer a strictly Arab movement or for that matter completely run by Algerians. As Weddady mentions above this is a worrying sign because it opens the playing field to operations and potential safe havens in other countries. It appears that although AQIM was fairly silent on the media front in 2009, over the past several months they have stepped up their media operations. Something to look for in future statements or video messages is whether AQIM is able to infiltrate networks in Morocco and recruit Moroccans. Also, whether there is a shift in messaging to more a Global Jihadist ideology where they focus less on local and regional issues and more on reclaiming territory occupied by Spain since in the past it was part of Muslim territory (al-Andalus).
Aaron Y. Zelin 