A Lesson on Islamic Law for Newt Gingrich

July 29, 2010
Newt Gingrich, Sayyid Qutb, Shari'ah

Earlier today, Newt Gingrich, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and former Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, presented a speech titled: “America at Risk: Camus, National Security, and Afghanistan.” In it he discussed a variety of issues, but the one that stuck out for me dealt with thesharī’ah (Islamic law). Gingrich stated:

Sharī’ah in its natural form has principles and punishments totally abhorrent to the Western world, and the underlying basic belief is that law comes directly from God. It is therefore imposed upon humans, and no human can change the law without it being an act of apostasy [irtidād].

Any student of Islamic studies will realize this is a completely simplistic understanding of the sharī’ah. Before discussing the sharī’ah and the establishment of law in Islam it is crucial to understand a few things first.

Indeed, in Islam, God is considered the lone sovereign (ḥākimīyyah). For instance, in Qur’anic verse 2:107 it says: “Do you not know that to God belongs the sovereignty of the heavens and the Earth”? But there are some Muslimjihādīs, such as Sayyid Qutb that link God’s sovereignty to governance. According to Sayed Khatab, Qutb’s theory of ḥākimīyyah denotes the following ideas: (1) “the system of government in Islam is not similar to any other system”; (2) “it is distinct from all forms of government in secular democracies”; (3) “it is constitutional”; (4) “it is not inherently theocratic or autocratic”; and (5) “the form of Islamic government has no impact on the Islamic identity of the state.”

In addition, the concept of ḥākimīyyah is connected to the concept of tawḥīd(oneness of God). As Qutb states:

Tawḥīd is that Allah is the Lord and Sovereign of people not merely in their beliefs, concepts, consciences, and rituals of worship, but in their political affairs … There is no God but God. There is no one worthy of worship except God, there is no creator or sustainer except God … There is no one in charge of the universe or even one’s own affairs except God … Thus, Muslims worship him alone … Muslims believe that there is no true ruler above them except Allah, no legislator for them except God, no one except God to inform them concerning their relationships and connections with the universe, with other living creatures, and with their fellow human beings. This is why Muslims turn to God for guidance and legislation in every aspect of life, whether it be political governance, economic justice, personal behavior, or the norms and standards of social intercourse.

When discussing the idea of Islamic governance, it was also essential for Qutb to connect the above terminologies – ḥākimīyyah and tawḥīd – to the sharī’ah. Qutb contends that for one to institute the sharī’ah one needs to first accept the idea behind tawḥīd, which based on the above definition, lends credence to the notion of ḥākimīyyah and one’s willingness to submit to the will of God and its laws. In other words, before one can follow the sharī’ah, one needs to believe in the idea of tawḥīd and ḥākimīyyah, which is a quintessential part of joining the faith of Islam.

The major problem with this is that Qutb and other jihadists for that matter are conceptualizing an Islamic state under the institutional framework of a nation-state, in that laws are codified and for jihādīs it is a totalitarian system that does not have any checks on power or law. This differs from the classical understanding, which Noah Feldman brilliantly explains in his book The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State. In it, Feldman points out that in the classical Islamic state, the ‘ulamā’ (religious scholars) provided a check on the power of the ruler since law was not a monopoly of the state like it is in the framework of the nation-state. This legal system was ever evolving and changing since there was a separation between the state and the sharī’ah. Therefore, according to Feldman it created: “[a] crucially [important] balance between the authority of the ruler and the law itself.”

This returns us to the original point of this post, which dealt with the creation of the sharī’ah. One derives sharī’ah from two primary sources: the Qur’ān and theSunnah (actions and sayings of Muhammad). Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) allows the ‘ulamā’ to interpret aspects of the sharī’ah to issues not directly addressed by the Qur’ān or Sunnah. These tools include using ijmā‘ (consensus of the scholars) and after that qīyās (analogy), while Shī’ah use ‘aql (reason) instead of qīyās.

The only individuals who are allowed to practice fiqh are qualified mujtahid’s(one who performs ijtihād or independent thought) who have gone through extensive training in classical Islamic and Qur’ānic sciences. One might answer by stating, well, I think I heard or have read something about the “gates of ijtihad being closed”. This is also a misnomer. Hakim Murad explains: “sophisticated mechanisms were available which not only permitted qualified individuals to derive the Sharī’ah from the Qur’ān and Sunnah on their own authority, but actually obliged them to do this.” Further, there are different levels of ijtihādthat a mujtahid could perform. The highest level is mujtahid fī-l-shar, which is an individual who does not need to follow a particular madhhab (legal school, there are four in Sunnī Islam) because he is advanced in his knowledge of the Islamic sciences. These were the individuals whom Abū ‘Abdullah Muhammad Ibn Idrīs al-Shafi’ī (or al-Shafi’ī) explained the “gates of ijtihād” were closed for since amujtahid of those heights could no longer exist. Therefore, the “gates of ijtihād” being closed was in reference to not being able to establish another madhhaboutside of the established four. As such, the ‘ulamā’ were still allowed to performijtihād, just the lower levels. These included: (1) a mujtahid fī-l-madhhab who could perform ijtihād within a specific school on an array of legal issues; (2) amujtahid muttabi (follower) “who follows his madhhab while being aware of the Qur’ānic and ḥadīth (sayings of Muhammad) texts and the reasoning, underlying its positions”; and (3) a mujtahid muqallid (emulator) “who simply conforms to the madhhab because of his confidence in its scholars, and without necessarily knowing the detailed reasoning behind all its thousands of rulings.”

These processes still exist at traditional religious establishments such as Jāmi’at(university) al-Azhar in Egypt, Jāmi’at al-Qarawiyyin in Morocco, Jāmi’at al-Zaytuna in Tunisia, and others. For example, scholars at al-Azhar issued a fatwāthat discusses the permissibility of celebrating Mothers Day, a non-Islamic holiday (for the record it is indeed permissible). One can see that the process of the sharī’ah is far more complicated and intellectually rigorous than how Gingrich described it in his speech and that Islamic scholars have the tools to evolve the law as time changes. This does not excuse the heinous acts in the name of trying to establish the sharī’ah by jihadists, but most of them are not qualified to truly derive Islamic law, but that is a whole other issue.

–

Sources:

Abdal-Hakim Murad, “Understanding the Four Madhhabs: The Problem with Anti-Madhhabism.” http://www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/ahm/newmadhh.htm.

Noah Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

Sayed Khatab, The Power of Sovereignty: The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb (London: Routledge, 2006).

Sayyid Qutb, Khasa’is al-Tasawur al-Islāmī wa Muqawimatuh (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1995).

 

Responding to Dr. Akram Hijazi’s: “Ibn Taymiyyah Reviews”

June 22, 2010
Ibn Taymiyyah, Mardin

Anṣār al-Mujāhidīn English Forum a popular online jihādī forum has recently translated an essay by Dr. Akram Ḥijāzī, who has written several essays in the past, about the conference in Mardin, Turkey this past March, which condemned Taqī ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyyah’s fatwā (legal ruling), which condoned the use of takfīr (excommunication). Ḥijāzī’s essay is unedited below, but before I posted a brief description/biography on Ibn Taymīyyah from some of my past research. The footnotes for the research are below Ḥijāzī’s essay.

Ibn Taymīyyah lived in Damascus during the time of the Mongol invasions of Islamic lands. This had a chilling effect because the Mongols sacked Baghdad, which was the seat of the Caliphate. Although the Mongols converted to Islam, Ibn Taymīyyah believed they were not true believers.[1] Ibn Taymīyyah was an ‘alim or religious scholar who followed the teachings of the Ḥanbali Law School, which had the strictest adherence to Islamic law of the four Sunni schools of law.

Ibn Taymīyyah spoke out against the Mongols because, in his view, they did not fully implement the sharī’ah (Islamic law).[2] Instead, they used a dual system that gave more weight to Mongol traditional law, the yassa code, which was a man-made law. The Mongols viewed Chinggis Khan as a sovereign and a prophet,[3] which would directly deviate from the Qur’anic verse 33:40 that states: “Muhammad is not the father of any man among you, but he is the Apostle of God and the Seal of the Prophets [Khātim al- Nabiyīn], and God has knowledge of all things.” Therefore, Ibn Taymīyyah viewed the Mongols as committing heresy and that they were introducing bid’ah (an innovation) that was perverting Islam.[4]

Ibn Taymīyyah also considered Shi’ism, certain aspects of Sufism and falsafah(philosophy) bid’ah as well.[5] Contrary to popular belief, though, Ibn Taymīyyah was not completely against Sufism. He was a member of the Qādirīyyah Sufi ṭarīqah (order), rather Ibn Taymīyyah took issue with certain aspects of Sufism such as the veneration of saints.[6] Ibn Taymīyyah would have also considered them sins, but not punishable by death like Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab, who misrepresented many aspects of Ibn Taymīyyah’s thought. For example, Muhammad Ibn Amḭr al-Ṣana’anī, originally a follower of ‘Abd al-Wahhab, once he decided to actually read ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s works he believed they were a “naïve and imperfect repetition of Ibn Taymīyyah’s doctrine.”[7] Further, Hamid Alger points out that: “whatever one makes of the positions assumed by Ibn Taymīyyah, there is no doubt that he was a far more rigorous and careful thinker and an infinitely prolific scholar than was Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab.”[8] Therefore, it could be argued that ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s selective use of Ibn Taymīyyah’s work and then later abridged versions of Ibn Taymīyyah’s works published by the Saudi state have created a misunderstanding of the corpus of Ibn Taymīyyah’s ideas, which is very intellectually sound compared to his caricature in much of the Western scholarship on him.

Drawing on past historical events, Ibn Taymīyyah reinterpreted the idea of jāhilīyyah and applied it to his time period. Therefore, since the Mongols adopted yassa code, they were considered by him to be in a state of jāhilīyyah.[9] This allowed Ibn Taymīyyah to call the Mongols apostates (murtadd) and pronounce takfīr (excommunication) against them from Islam. Ibn Taymīyyah viewed the Mongols as creating fitnah (disturbance, anarchy) within the Islamic community because of their differing beliefs similar to thefitnah during the period following the Kharijites assassination of the forth Caliph ‘Alī Ibn Abū Ṭālib.[10] Therefore, using qīyās (analogical reasoning), Ibn Taymīyyah issued a fatwā(legal ruling) calling for an obligatory jihād (farḍ al-‘ayn) against the Mongols and those who supported them, which stated: “Every group of Muslims [in reference to the Mongols] that transgresses Islamic law [the implementation of the Mongols’ yassa code] … must be combated, even when they continue to profess the credo.”[11]

It is worthwhile to examine two notions that are misrepresented about Ibn Taymīyyah in the literature. First, Ibn Taymīyyah did not promote capital punishment for apostasy as has been interpreted by later jihadists from his thought. As Mohammad Hashim Kamali points out: “[Ibn Taymīyyah] held that apostasy is a sin which carries no ḥadd (fixed) punishment and that a sin of this kind may be punished only under the discretionary punishment of ta’zīr(corporal).”[12] As such, Ibn Taymīyyah does not view apostasy as a capital crime, which jihadists do today. Indeed, Ibn Taymīyyah called to kill the apostate Mongols, but it was only specific to that instance since if one looked to Ibn Taymīyyah’s full collection of work, which jihadists do not do they would realize they are completely taking his work out of context. The other problematic interpretation of Ibn Taymīyyah is that he believed that one should rebel against any leader who did not fully adhere to the Islamic faith. In truth, similar to the orthodox Sunni ‘ulamā’ understanding, Ibn Taymīyyah believed one should be obedient to their leader even if they were unjust. Victor E. Makari explains Ibn Taymīyyah’s views: “To be obedient to those in authority is not only commanded by God, but also is itself an extension of the believer’s obedience to Him and to His Prophet.”[13] Later Makari explains: “Ibn Taymīyyah placed social peace above the exercise of the right to dissent.”[14] Moreover, Ibn Taymīyyah stated: “It is the duty of Muslims to obey their ruler whether he is impious or ignorant,” as long as Muslims are allowed to practice their faith without interference.[15]

_____

[1] Karen Armstrong. Islam: A Short History (New York: The Modern Library, 2002), 104.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Denis Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād al-Shām by Ghāzān Khān and Ibn Taymīyah’s Three “Anti-Mongol Fatwas,” Mamlūk Studies Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2007, 114.

[4] Armstrong, 104.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2002), 10.

[7] Hamadi Redissi, “The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources, 1745-1932,” (ed.) Madawi al-Rasheed, Kingdom Without Borders: Saudi Political, Religious and Media Frontiers (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 168.

[8] Algar, 9.

[9] Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh(Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), 194.

[10] Aigle, 103.

[11] Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), 128.

[12] Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Punishment in Islamic Law: A Critique of the Hudud Bill of Kelantan, Malaysia,” Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1998, 213; Ibn Taymīyyah, al-Ṣārim al-Maslūl, Muḥayy al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Ḥamid (ed.) (Beirut: Daral- Kitab, 1978), p. 318.

[13] Victor E. Makari, Ibn Taymīyyah’s Ethics: The Social Factor (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983), 154.

[14] Ibid., 156.

[15] Ibid.

Check out my new article in Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel: “Round seven in northern Yemen?”

April 20, 2010
Huthis, Sa'ada War, Yemen

The news that the Obama administration had approved the extra-judicial killing of an American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki has extended Yemen’s fifteen minutes of fame. Awlaki was accused of assisting al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and helping inspire the Ford Hood shooter Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, and recruiting the failed Christmas Day bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. This widely publicized incident has overshadowed a far more significant and worrisome story coming out of Yemen in the past week, one that could further hamper Yemen’s efforts in combating AQAP. The two-month truce between the Yemeni government and the so-called Houthi rebels in Yemen’s north has started to deteriorate. Last Wednesday it wasreported that a member of the Houthis murdered a school security guard. The next day, according to Yemeni officials, the Houthis shot unsuccessfully at a military plane. Security officials announced this past Saturday that a Houthi member killed a Yemeni soldier.

Houthi representatives have denied the latter two claims, but it might not matter. While it is nearly impossible to verify either claim since there is no independent media in Sa’ada, the Yemeni government has started to view these events as a breach of the cease-fire agreement. Brian O’Neil, a former writer and editor for the Yemen Observer, explains: “The truth here doesn’t actually matter. What matters is the willingness of the parties to believe the stories. That is how wars start, or start again.” If the war resumes, it could jeopardize the tentative gains of recent months, complicating American efforts to support the Yemeni government’s campaign against AQAP, and spark another humanitarian and political disaster for Yemen’s people.

The Houthis trace their origins back to a Zaydi Shi’ite revivalist movement, “al- Shabab al-Mu’mineen” (the Believing Youth), which was responding to Wahhabist proselytization efforts in the northern Yemen province of Sa’ada. Hussein Badr ad-Din al-Houthi, the original leader of the Houthi rebellion whose death ended the first battle in September 2004, complained of marginalization and claimed that Yemeni President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh had not focused on building institutions or investing in public services in Sa’ada. Hussein became more outspoken and critical of President Saleh following 9/11, arguing that Saleh used the War on Terror as justification for targeting the group and arresting its members. The conflict came to a head on June 18, 2004, when the Yemeni police arrested 640 protesters in front of Sana’a Grand Mosque. Two days later, Yemen’s security apparatus tried to arrest Hussein in Marran district in Sa’ada leading to clashes between Yemeni soldiers and the Houthis. What was originally seen as a police operation quicklyturned into a full-fledged battle in which Hussein was killed.

The conflict between the Houthis, now led by ‘Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, and the Yemeni government has witnessed a familiar pattern of clashes, ceasefires, and then renewed fighting.  In previous rounds of battle, similar low-level confrontations and accusations of each side breaking agreements led to a renewal of major conflict. For instance, the second battle began in March, 2005 when Yemeni security forces killed three members of the Houthis because of their alleged failure to disarm. Clashes broke out between the two sides, leading to twenty-one deaths and the start of the third installment of fighting in late November, 2005. The fourth battle began in January, 2007 when Houthi militants attacked security strongholds, leaving six people dead. Major fighting was initiated again in May, 2008 when a motorcycle rigged with explosives blew up outside of a Mosque in Sa’ada, sparking the fifth round of fighting. Lastly, the sixth and most recent battle began in August, 2009 because the Houthis took control of a stretch of highway that linked Sana’a to the Saudi border. In light of these past events, it would hardly be surprising if these minor incidents over the past week lead to an outbreak of a seventh round of fighting.

Another outbreak of war would be damaging to American counterterrorism efforts against AQAP. Yemen’s assistance in combating AQAP would be hampered since President Saleh views AQAP as less of a threat to his power in contrast to the Houthis and the Southern Movement attempting to secede in the south. Therefore, much of the government’s security apparatus would be allocated again to the north, and there would be increased risks of it diverting aid intended to be used against AQAP to its struggle in the North.

More importantly, it would be harmful to Yemen and its citizens.  A new outbreak of fighting would further embed war spending in Yemen’s economy, from which both sides and intermediaries have benefited. In the past it has also allowed the Yemeni government to expand its military budget. What’s more, because of a lack of governmental oversight, military officials have taken to trafficking weapons, some of which ironically have ended up in the hands of the Houthis. This has exacerbated the militarization of the government, which has become far more tyrannical whenhandling the protests led by the southern movement. Although southern movement leaders have rejected AQAP, it could potentially lead southerners to look to AQAP since its leader Nasser al-Wahayshi has endorsed their cause. Furthermore, the effects of another war in the north will further exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, which has left more than 250,000 Yemenis internally displaced.

If the United States wants full cooperation from President Saleh in denying AQAP a safe haven, the conflict in the north must be resolved. Rather than helping Yemen defeat the Houthi insurgency, the U.S. should support efforts to maintain the ceasefire and find a political solution to the ongoing conflict. It is in the United States’ interest to convince the Yemeni government to be patient with alleged violations of the recent cease-fire agreement since the Houthis are willing to look into the provocations from the past week. Moreover, the beginning of a new round of fighting would erase all the positive, yet limited progress that has been established over the past two months. The United States and Yemen’s citizens can only hope that renewed fighting does not take place, for if it does, the consequences could be very detrimental.

Aaron Y. Zelin is an M.A. candidate at Brandeis University, researching the intellectual origins of al Qaeda’s ideology.

Check out my new article with Andrew Lebovich at Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel: “The commentators march to war”

March 25, 2010
Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon, Media Criticism

As Robert S. Ford prepares for his confirmation hearing Tuesday to become the first American Ambassador to Syria since 2005, one of the things he’ll have to deal with are the perennial warnings that war between Israel and Hezbollah is just around the corner. But Ford should know that despite grandstanding from politicians and frightening rhetoric from the media, war is unlikely to break out anytime soon.

During late January and early February of this year, for instance, press reports were filled with a steady drumbeat for war between Israel and Hezbollah, with both sides warning of immediate conflict and boasting of certain victory. Yet only one party seemed ready for war: the press. Headlines ominously predicted war: the liberal Israeli daily Haaretz warned that, “Israel, Hezbollah inch toward military conflict,” Dubai’s The National asked if 2009 was, “the calm before the storm?” for Israel, and London-based Asharq al-Awsat reported that, “France vows to prevent Israeli strike on Lebanon’s infrastructure.” Other articles quoting ex-Israeli generals, Hezbollah and Lebanese officials and others have drawn the conclusion that war is imminent. But is it really? We believe that this tired and oft-repeated mantra does not stand up to questioning, and that a variety of factors – historical, military, and political – will militate against the prospect of imminent war between the two.

We’ve heard this story before, and as before, the rhetoric eventually died away. But the recent “war meeting” between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah has once again sparked noise from the mediaand think tanks regarding the possibility of war between Israel and Hezbollah.

Ever since the Second Lebanon War ended in August 2006 there has been chatter and rhetoric that another conflict was just around the corner. In February 2007, Amir Peretz, former Israeli Defense Minister, in response to news that Hezbollah was rearming itself stated: “We can’t under any circumstances ignore the transfer of weapons and ammunition to Hezbollah, we reserve the right to protect the citizens of the state of Israel and we will do this forcefully without any compromises.” Later in the year, both Israel and Hezbollah conducted maneuvering drills near their respective borders, which raised specter of another war erupting.

This fear resurfaced again in 2008. The assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, a senior member in Hezbollah, sparked the flames of combat again since many theorized Israel was behind it. Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, responded by claiming that if Israel wanted “open war” with Hezbollah, they would get it. In late March of that year an Israeli security sourcebelieved conflict was coming in the summer of 2008, but it never came to fruition. During the fall, both sides were tangled in a war of words yet again. In August, Nasrallah explained that war with Israel had not ended. A month and a half later, Major-General Gadi Eisenkot, the Israeli military’s Northern Command Chief, cautioned Hezbollah that in another war, Israel would destroy it.

Once more, the saber-rattling and expectations of war resurfaced in 2009. During the three-year anniversary speech of the Second Lebanon Wars end, Nasrallah warned Israel that Hezbollah was capable of hitting any Israeli village or city. Ehud Barak, Israel’s Defense Minister, stated that if there were another war Israel would bomb Lebanese infrastructure. What alarmed and worried individuals further were the various Israeli spy cells caught in Lebanon throughout 2009.

In the most recent war of words, Saad Hariri, the Prime Minister of Lebanon, backed Hezbollah if Israel attacked, stating: “I think they’re betting that there might be some division in Lebanon, if there is a war against us. Well, there won’t be a division in Lebanon. We will stand against Israel. We will stand with our own people.” During a speech commemorating Imad Mugniyah’s assassination, Hassan Nasrallah called for a defensive, yet offensive stance against Israelproclaiming: “If you strike Beirut, we will strike Tel Aviv.”

The persistent rhetoric on both sides is not reassuring, but that does not necessarily mean war is going to occur anytime soon. Much of it is posturing and both sides trying to maintain their deterrence against one another. As Flynt and Hillary Leverett argued in a recent blog post, Nasrallah’s language, while aggressive, showed that Hezbollah only threatened to strike Israel if attacked first. And this week Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barack told an audience that Israel would “hold all of Lebanon responsible,” in the event of a war, but only if Hezbollah struck first. Yet in the past few years random rocket fire from Southern Lebanon into Northern Israel has notprovoked any meaningful response from the IDF. In fact, both sides have a considerable amount to lose if they do pick up arms again.

Israel’s possible calculus for war remains difficult to decipher. Despite the fact that many perceived the Second Lebanon War to be a black eye for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), the northern border has been quiet since 2006. Even as Israeli officials warn about the flow of weapons into Lebanon, the IDF have taken no overt action to disable Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Some, like long-time Middle East chronicler Robert Fisk believe an Israeli strike at Hezbollah could go hand in hand with an attack on Iran. But this theory rests on the speculation that Israel intends to attack Iran. While this speculation runs rampant through newspapers (fed in large part by Israeli threats and highly-publicized military exercises) not even reports of secret reactors have provoked Israeli action, and any Israeli strike would require at least American acquiescence, which does not seem to be in the offing. Furthermore, no convincing argument has appeared to show how, exactly, an Israeli military strike would succeed in disrupting Iran’s nuclear program or even successfully engaging Iranian targets.

Moreover, Israel has a multitude of concerns that could limit its willingness to go to war at any point in the near future. Aside from fear of suffering another draw with Hezbollah, a pre-emptive war that brings a shower of rockets on Israeli cities would have serious political consequences, especially if the reason for such a strike is unclear. If Israel makes good on some officials’ claims that any assault on Lebanon would be “disproportionate” and target the broader Lebanese infrastructure, Israel would face a further deterioration of its status in the international community, even among itsallies. But the more important question is whether Israel would be able to handle a major military operation more than three years after the Second Lebanon War? According to a recently-released Israeli State Comptroller’s report, the IDF is having trouble with recruitment and training its soldiers.

Arguments that Hezbollah plans on imminent war with Israel run into similar problems. On the one hand, since the Second Lebanon War Hezbollah has grown far stronger. Despite suffering a setback in elections last year, Hezbollah maintained its political dominance by securing veto authority over Lebanese government decisions and even political approval for the group’s stockpile of arms (not that the 2008 street battles in Beirut left the government much choice). Hezbollah hasstockpiled an estimated 40,000 rockets, some with the range to hit Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and possesses skilled military units and even air defense systems. News that Hezbollah has dispersed these rockets north of the Litani river and even in and around Beirut indicates for some, as theWashington Post recently noted, that Hezbollah is gearing up for war and wants to protect its most valuable weapons systems from quick destruction.

On the other hand, in the three years since the last war, Hezbollah has remained conspicuously quiet. This despite the unexplained explosion at the house of a Hezbollah official in October, the explosion of a suspected Hezbollah arms cache in southern Lebanon in July, the assassination in 2008 of Hezbollah hero Imad Mughniyeh, and continued Israeli provocation in the form of overflights of southern Lebanon. When Israel was busy destroying much of Gaza last January, Hezbollah did nothing.

The continued integration of Hezbollah into Lebanon’s political system also makes war less, not more, likely. Despite its independent power base, weapons and money, Hezbollah still relies on popular support, especially in the Shi’a south. Yet as Lebanon specialist Elias Muhanna (author of the popular blog Qifa Nabki) points out, the destruction likely to result from a full-scale Israeli attack prompted by a Hezbollah provocation could hurt Hezbollah’s standing with its Shi’a power base, and could cause widespread distaste with the movement if Beirut and other areas take a beating. Additionally, while Hezbollah now has formal government approval for its right to possess arms, this could prove a double-edged sword; Israel could justify a strike into Lebanon by pointing to Hezbollah’s government role, while both Hezbollah’s leadership and its March 8 allies might come under serious fire for sparking a war with Israel for no apparent gain.

This is not to say that a war will not occur. The combination of heightened rhetoric, bruised egos, huge weapons stores and political volatility in multiple countries could very well spark conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. But a variety of factors continue to make immediate war unlikely, despite the media hysteria. Let’s just hope it stays that way.

Andrew Lebovich is a program associate with the New America Foundation’s American Strategy Program. Aaron Y. Zelin is a Master’s Candidate at Brandeis University researching the intellectual origins of al-Qaeda’s ideology.